Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : What is the reasoning of Rav Ḥisda, who holds that the requirement to return the animal with the owner’s knowledge is in the case where the owners did not know about the theft? Since the thief taught the lamb to take steps outside, i.e., to leave the owners’ property, it will now require greater supervision, which the owners can provide only if they are aware of the situation.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב חִסְדָּא? הוֹאִיל וְאַנְקְטַהּ נִגְרֵי בָּרָיָיתָא.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara assumes that since Rava explained Rav Ḥisda’s reasoning, he accepts Rav Ḥisda’s ruling. The Gemara asks: But did Rava actually say this? Doesn’t Rava say that in the case of this person who saw another lift a lamb from his flock in order to steal it, and the owner then raised his voice at the thief, and the thief discarded it, but the owner did not know if the thief returned the lamb or if he did not return it, and the lamb then died or was stolen, the thief is to pay restitution for it?
וּמִי אָמַר רָבָא הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: הַאי מַאן דְּחַזְיֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ דְּאַגְבַּהּ אִימְּרָא מֵעֶדְרָא דִידֵיהּ, וּרְמָא בֵּיהּ קָלָא וְשַׁדְיֵיהּ, וְלָא יְדַע אִי הֲדַרָה אִי לָא הֲדַרָה, וּמֵת אוֹ נִגְנַב – חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתוֹ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara comments: What, is this statement of Rava not applicable even if the owner counted his flock after this incident? Accordingly, Rava rules that if the owner knew about the theft, the thief is rendered exempt from liability only if he returns the lamb with the owner’s knowledge, which is not in accordance with the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: No, Rava’s ruling applies only where the owner did not count the flock.
מַאי, לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דִּמְנִי? לָא, דְּלָא מְנִי.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara examines Rav’s ruling. But did Rav actually say this? Doesn’t Rav say that if the thief returned the lamb to the owner’s flock that is in an unsettled area, he has fulfilled his obligation to return it? This indicates that the thief is exempt from further liability even though the thief did not inform the owner of the lamb’s return and the owner did not count the flock. The Gemara answers that Rav Ḥanan bar Abba said: Rav concedes that the thief is exempt in this case only where the lamb was spotted [birkuata]. Since the lamb’s spots are distinctive, the owner immediately becomes aware of its return.
וּמִי אָמַר רַב הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַב: הֶחְזִירוֹ לְעֵדֶר שֶׁבַּמִּדְבָּר – יָצָא! אָמַר רַב חָנָן בַּר אַבָּא: מוֹדֶה רַב בִּרְקוֹעָתָא.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the amoraic dispute cited previously is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: One who steals a lamb from a flock or a sela from a purse must return it to the place from where he stole it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The thief is required to return it with the knowledge of its owners.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַגּוֹנֵב טָלֶה מִן הָעֵדֶר, וְסֶלַע מִן הַכִּיס – לִמְקוֹם שֶׁגָּנַב יַחֲזִיר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: צָרִיךְ דַּעַת בְּעָלִים.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara explains: The Sages discussing the matter assumed that everyone accepts the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his purse constantly, and therefore becomes aware of the theft soon after it takes place. What, is it not a case where a sela was stolen with the owner’s knowledge, and the dispute of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva is parallel to the dispute of Rav and Shmuel? According to this explanation, Rav rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and Shmuel rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.
סַבְרוּהָ, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּכִיסוֹ בְּכׇל שָׁעָה. מַאי, לָאו בְּסֶלַע לְדַעַת – וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: No, they disagree in the case of a lamb that was stolen without the knowledge of its owners, i.e., they did not know that it was stolen, and the dispute of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva is parallel to the dispute of Rav Ḥisda and Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rav Ḥisda rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva that the lamb must be returned with the owner’s knowledge, and Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael that the owners do not need to become aware of the lamb’s return.
לָא; בְּטָלֶה שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת, וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַב חִסְדָּא וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: With regard to a bailee who stole a lamb from the owner’s domain, everyone, including Rabbi Yishmael, agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, and the owner must be aware of the animal’s return in order for the thief to become exempt from further liability. And here it is with regard to whether a bailee who stole from within his own domain may return what he stole to the place from where he stole it that they disagree. Rabbi Akiva holds: His safeguarding was terminated when he stole the lamb and he must therefore return it with the owner’s knowledge. And Rabbi Yishmael holds: His safeguarding was not terminated and he may return it to his own domain.
אָמַר רַב זְבִיד מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: בְּשׁוֹמֵר שֶׁגָּנַב מֵרְשׁוּת בְּעָלִים – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי, כִּדְרַב חִסְדָּא; וְהָכָא בְּשׁוֹמֵר שֶׁגָּנַב מֵרְשׁוּתוֹ, שֶׁיַּחֲזִיר לִמְקוֹם שֶׁגָּנַב קָמִיפַּלְגִי – רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: כָּלְתָה לוֹ שְׁמִירָתוֹ, וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סָבַר: לֹא כָּלְתָה לוֹ שְׁמִירָתוֹ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara suggests: Let us say that with regard to the dispute over whether the owner’s counting of his flock exempts a thief who returned a stolen lamb without notifying the owner, it is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who robbed another and then included the money he owed him for the robbery in the calculation of the payment for a different transaction, i.e., he compensated the owner by overpaying him for a different transaction, it is taught in one baraita: He has fulfilled his obligation to pay, and it is taught in another baraita: He has not fulfilled his obligation to pay.
לֵימָא מִנְיָן פּוֹטֵר – תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: הַגּוֹזֵל אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ, וְהִבְלִיעַ לוֹ בְּחֶשְׁבּוֹן – תָּנֵי חֲדָא: יָצָא, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: לֹא יָצָא.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Sages discussing the matter assumed that everyone accepts the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his purse constantly, and therefore becomes aware that he has been compensated soon after the payment is made. What, is it not with regard to this following point that they disagree: The one who says that the robber has fulfilled his obligation holds that the counting of the property exempts a robber from further liability, and the one who says that the robber has not fulfilled his obligation holds that the counting does not exempt a robber from further liability.
סַבְרוּהָ, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק, דְּאָמַר: אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּכִיסוֹ בְּכׇל שָׁעָה וְשָׁעָה. מַאי, לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר יָצָא, סָבַר: מִנְיָן פּוֹטֵר; וּמַאן דְּאָמַר לֹא יָצָא, סָבַר: מִנְיָן אֵינוֹ פּוֹטֵר?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: One can say that if we held in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, it would follow that everyone agrees that the counting of the property exempts a robber from further liability. Rather, it is with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak itself that they disagree: One Sage accepts the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and one Sage does not accept the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak.
אָמְרִי: אִי סְבִירָא לַן כְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּמִנְיָן פּוֹטֵר; אֶלָּא בִּדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק קָמִיפַּלְגִי – מָר אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק, וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And if you wish, say instead that everyone accepts the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and it is not difficult: This first baraita, which rules that the robber fulfilled his obligation, is discussing a case where the robber counted the money and placed it directly in the owner’s purse, which the owner will soon open and count. And that other baraita, which rules that the robber did not fulfill his obligation, is discussing a case where he counted the money and placed it in the owner’s hand. Consequently, it is possible that the owner will put the money directly into a container with other coins in it and will never realize that he was compensated for the theft.
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק; וְלָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דִּמְנִי וּרְמָא לֵיהּ בְּכִיסֵיהּ, וְהָא דִּמְנִי וּרְמָא לִידֵיהּ.