Traité Bava Metzia

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : unless the verse specifies that one is liable only where he curses both together, which it does not do in this case.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: You can even say that Rabbi Natan’s derivation from the word “or” is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as here, in the verse concerning a borrower’s liability, there is no need for the word “or” to divide the cases. What is the reason? The fact that injury and death are alone sufficient to engender liability is based on logical reasoning, as follows: What difference does it make to me if it is entirely killed, and what difference does it make to me if it is partially killed, i.e., injured? Either way, the animal is not in the state in which it was borrowed, so the borrower is liable to compensate the owner.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact that a borrower is liable if the animal entrusted to him was injured or died, because theft and loss are similar to injury and death in that they are cases of accidents, this derivation can be refuted. What is notable about a case where the animal was injured or died? It is notable in that it is no longer possible to make an effort and bring the animal back to its undamaged state, and so it is reasonable that the borrower is liable for such occurrences. Shall you also say this ruling about a case of theft or loss, where it is still possible to make an effort to locate and bring back the animal? Since the animal is still extant, perhaps the borrower should not be liable.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, a borrower’s liability for theft and loss is derived like that which is taught in a baraita: From the verse: “And it is injured or dies” (Exodus 22:13), I have derived only that a borrower is liable if the animal is injured or dies. From where do I derive that he is liable in a case of theft or loss? You can say it is an a fortiori inference: If a paid bailee, who is exempt from liability in a case in which the animal is injured or dies, is nevertheless liable in a case of theft or loss, then with regard to a borrower, who is liable in a case in which the animal is injured or dies, isn’t it logical that he should also be liable in a case of theft or loss? And this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: What is added by the conclusion of the baraita that this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation? The Gemara explains that the baraita anticipated the following rebuttal: And if you would say that the a fortiori inference can be refuted as follows: What is notable about the case of a paid bailee? It is notable in that he pays the double payment when he takes a false oath stating the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit. If so, can you derive a halakha from the case of a paid bailee to that of a borrower, who pays only the principal in such a case? It would appear that a borrower does not always bear a more severe level of liability, and the a fortiori inference is thereby undermined.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Anticipating this refutation, the baraita states that it is invalid because even so, the fact that a borrower is liable to pay the principal when he claims the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, without the ability to exempt himself by taking an oath, is a greater stringency than the fact that a paid bailee is liable for the double payment, but only if he takes a false oath to that effect. Consequently, a borrower has a more severe level of liability, and the a fortiori inference is valid.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Alternatively, if you wish, say that the baraita holds that an armed bandit is classified as a robber. The paid bailee is not liable for the double payment if he claims that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, as the double payment is paid only for a false claim of theft, not robbery. Consequently, the basis of the refutation is flawed.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: We have found sources for the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss; from where do we derive a source for the halakha that in a case of theft or loss he is exempt if he had also borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as borrowing the animal? The verse describing his exemption from liability is stated only with regard to a case in which the animal entrusted to him is injured or dies (see Exodus 22:13).

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies, as the type of occurrence should not make any difference, then one can counter: What is notable about a case in which it is injured or dies? It is notable in that it is an unavoidable accident, and so it is reasonable that one’s liability be limited. Can you say the same in a case of theft or loss, which theoretically he could have prevented?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, derive the halakha that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies from the halakha of a paid bailee, who is exempt for theft and loss if he had borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as the animal. The Gemara asks: But from where do we derive that the exemption from liability also applies to a paid bailee himself? We derive the limitation of liability of a paid bailee from the limitation of liability of a borrower: Just as below, with regard to a borrower, for those cases in which the verse states that he is liable, it states that if he borrowed the animal together with the services of the owner that he is exempt, so too, here, with regard to a paid bailee, for those cases in which he is liable, if he undertook to safeguard the animal together with borrowing the services of the owner, then he is exempt.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: Through what method is this derived? If it is derived through an interpretive principle known as: What do we find, i.e., a comparison between cases with similar details, this can be refuted, just as we refuted the possibility of deriving a limitation on one’s liability in a case of theft or loss from a case in which the animal was injured or died. Because a case in which it is injured or dies is an unavoidable accident, it is reasonable that one’s liability be limited specifically to such circumstances.