Traité Bava Metzia

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : that they are trampled. Even if there had been a distinguishing mark on the bundles it would have been destroyed when it was trampled. If he finds them in a secluded area, the finder takes the sheaves and proclaims his find, as due to the absence of pedestrian traffic they are not trampled and the distinguishing mark remains intact. And with regard to the sheaves, whether he finds them in a public area or whether he finds them in a secluded area, the finder takes them and proclaims his find. Since they protrude high above the ground, they are not trampled.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And Rava explains, according to his line of reasoning, that the baraita is referring to bundles whose location is their distinguishing mark: If one finds bundles of grain in a public area, these belong to him due to the fact that they are kicked and they consequently roll to a different location than where they were placed. If he finds them in a secluded area, he is obligated to proclaim his find. Due to the absence of pedestrian traffic they are not kicked and do not roll, and they therefore remain in the location where they were placed. And with regard to the sheaves, whether he finds them in a public area or whether he finds them in a secluded area, the finder takes them and proclaims his find. Since they are heavy, they do not roll when kicked.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found baker’s loaves, these belong to him. The Gemara infers: But if one finds loaves of a homeowner, he is obligated to proclaim his find. What is the reason? When one finds loaves of a homeowner he is obligated to proclaim his find because there is a distinguishing mark on the loaves. As each person shapes his loaves in a unique manner, it is known that the loaves of a person belong to that person. And there is no difference if the loaves were found in a public area, and there is no difference if the loaves were found in a secluded area; the finder takes the item and proclaims his find. Apparently, the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is that of a distinguishing mark. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabba.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabba could have said to you: There, this is the reason that one must return the loaves of a homeowner found in a public area. It is due to the fact that one does not pass by food without picking it up. Therefore, it can be assumed that it will not be trampled. The Gemara asks: But aren’t there gentiles who do not treat food with deference and who will trample the loaves? The Gemara answers: Gentiles are concerned that the loaves were placed in a public area for reasons of sorcery. The Gemara asks: But aren’t there beasts and dogs that will trample the loaves? The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a place where beasts and dogs are not commonly found.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rabba and Rava is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im in the mishna. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one finds any lost item in which there is an alteration, he is obligated to proclaim his find. How so? If he found a round cake of pressed figs with an earthenware shard inside it, or a loaf of bread with coins inside it, he must proclaim his find. One may conclude by inference that the first tanna of the mishna holds that even in that case those items belong to him.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : In explaining the tannaitic dispute, the Sages assumed that everyone agrees that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own without having been placed there intentionally is that of a distinguishing mark, and everyone agrees that one passes by food without picking it up. Accordingly, what is the basis of their dispute? Is it not with regard to the matter of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled that they disagree? As one Sage, the first tanna, holds that its legal status is not that of a distinguishing mark, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that its legal status is that of a distinguishing mark.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: If it enters your mind that the first tanna holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is not that of a distinguishing mark and that one passes by food without picking it up, then in the case of loaves of a homeowner that were found in a public area, where the loaves would be trampled and their distinguishing mark destroyed, why does he proclaim his find?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava that everyone holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is that of a distinguishing mark and that one passes by food without picking it up. And here, it is with regard to the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own that they disagree. The first tanna holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own is not that of a distinguishing mark, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own is that of a distinguishing mark.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And Rabba could have said to you that everyone agrees that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is not that of a distinguishing mark and that one does not pass by food without picking it up. And here, it is with regard to the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own that they disagree. The first tanna holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own is not that of a distinguishing mark, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own is that of a distinguishing mark.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : There are those who say, in explaining the tannaitic dispute, that the Sages assumed that everyone agrees that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own without having been placed there intentionally is that of a distinguishing mark, and everyone agrees that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is not that of a distinguishing mark. What, then, is the basis of their dispute? Is it not with regard to the matter of whether one passes by food without picking it up that they disagree. As one Sage, the first tanna, holds that one passes by food without picking it up, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that one does not pass by food without picking it up.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: If it enters your mind that the first tanna holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is not that of a distinguishing mark and that one passes by food without picking it up, then in the case of loaves of a homeowner that were found in a public area, where the loaves would be trampled and their distinguishing mark destroyed, why does he proclaim his find?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava that everyone holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is that of a distinguishing mark and that one passes by food without picking it up. And here, it is with regard to the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own that they disagree. The first tanna holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own is not that of a distinguishing mark, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that could come to mark an item on its own is that of a distinguishing mark.