Traité Niddah

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : and derive the halakha from the analogy that is free on both sides. And it is for this reason that the Merciful One rendered the verbal analogy between animal and man free on both sides, so that one would not derive the halakha from the verbal analogy between sea monster and man, which is free on only one side.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches in the name of Rabbi Elazar a more lenient version of the aforementioned principle of exegesis of verbal analogy: With regard to any verbal analogy that is not free at all, one can derive halakhot from it, but one can also refute it logically. If the verbal analogy is free on one side, according to Rabbi Yishmael one can derive halakhot from it, and one cannot refute it. According to the Rabbis, one can derive halakhot from it, but one can also refute it. If the verbal analogy is free on both sides, everyone agrees that one can derive halakhot from it and one cannot refute it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: But if so, according to the Rabbis, what difference is there between a verbal analogy that is free on one side and one that is not free at all? In both cases, the Rabbis hold that one can derive halakhot from such a verbal analogy but one can also refute it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: The difference is in a case where you find two mutually exclusive verbal analogies, one that is free on one side and one that is not free at all, and neither does this one have a logical refutation nor does that one have a logical refutation. In such a case, we disregard the analogy that is not free at all, and we derive the halakha from the one that is free on one side.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: And here, with regard to the verbal analogy between man and sea monster, which was rejected because it is free on only one side, what logical refutation is there on account of which this verbal analogy is rejected? The Gemara answers: The verbal analogy between man and sea monster is rejected because it can be refuted as follows: What is unique about man? Man is unique in that a person can become impure while he is alive, unlike an animal, which can become impure only after it dies, or a sea monster, which cannot become impure at all.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And likewise, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that a woman who discharges an item similar to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird is impure: It is because formation is stated with regard to the creation of these animals, just as it is stated with regard to the creation of man.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Ami said to him: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the shape of a mountain, its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, as it is stated with regard to the creation of mountains: “For He Who forms the mountains and creates the wind” (Amos 4:13). Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Does she discharge a mountain? The discharged item cannot possibly be that large. It is an item with the form of a stone that she discharges, and that is called a clod, not a mountain.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Ami further inquired: If that is so, in the case of a woman who discharges an item having an amorphous form [ruaḥ], its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since creation is stated with regard to it, just as it is stated with regard to man, as it is written: “And creates the wind [ruaḥ].” And if you would say that no verbal analogy can be drawn here, because the verse is not free, i.e., it is not superfluous, as it is necessary to recount the creation of the wind, that is not so. Rabbi Ami explains: From the fact that the verse could have written: Who forms the mountains and the wind, and instead it is written: “Who forms the mountains and creates the wind,” conclude from it that the superfluous word “creates” serves to render it free for drawing a verbal analogy between ruaḥ and man.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: One derives matters that are stated in the Torah from matters that are stated in the Torah, i.e., from verses in the Torah, but one does not derive matters that are stated in the Torah from the words of the tradition, i.e., verses in the Prophets or the Writings, such as the verse in Amos.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir: Since the eyes of these animals are similar to those of a human, a woman who discharges an item of that type is impure.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara objects: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake, its mother should likewise be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since the pupil of a snake is round, like that of a human. And if you would say that indeed, this is the halakha, then let the mishna teach this case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake among the other cases where the woman discharges an item of an unusual form.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara explains: If the mishna had taught the case of a snake, I would say that it is only in the case of a woman who discharges an item having the form of a snake that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and rule that the woman is not impure, as a term of formation is not written with regard to the creation of the snake. But with regard to a woman who discharges an item having the form of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, they do not disagree with Rabbi Meir, as the concept of formation is written with regard to them.