Traité Menachot

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara notes: And this statement of Reish Lakish was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated by inference, i.e., it is evident from a different statement of Reish Lakish that this is his opinion. As we learned in a mishna (68b): One may not bring a meal offering, the first fruits, or the meal offering brought with the libations accompanying an animal offering, from the new crop, prior to the sacrifice of the omer. The Gemara interrupts its citation of the mishna to add that the reason is that we require that an offering be “from the well-watered pastures of Israel,” i.e., it must be brought from that which is permitted to the Jewish people, and the new crop has not yet been permitted to them. The mishna concludes: And if he brought these offerings from the new crop they are unfit.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The mishna continues: After the omer but prior to the two loaves one may not bring those offerings from the new crop. The Gemara explains that this is because the two loaves are called first fruits, and therefore they should precede all other offerings from the new crop. The mishna adds: But if he brought those offerings from the new crop, they are fit.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And Rav Yitzḥak says that Reish Lakish says: The Sages taught that a meal offering that was brought from the new crop before the omer meal offering is disqualified only if it was brought on the fourteenth or on the fifteenth of Nisan. But if it was on the sixteenth, then even if he brought it prior to the omer meal offering, it is valid. He continues: And this statement poses a difficulty for me: Why should meal offerings be valid when sacrificed on the sixteenth if they were sacrificed before the omer meal offering? Let them be considered like offerings whose time has not yet arrived. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Reish Lakish holds that the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The Gemara previously cited the opinion of Rav that an omer meal offering from which a handful was removed not for its own sake is disqualified. The Gemara also cited the opinion of Reish Lakish that this meal offering is valid but another omer meal offering is necessary to permit the new crop for consumption. And Rava says: With regard to an omer meal offering from which the priest removed a handful not for its own sake, it is valid and its remainder is consumed, and it does not require another omer meal offering to permit it for consumption. The reason is that improper intent is effective [mo’elet] to disqualify an offering only when it is expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service, and with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service, and in a place that is fit for the Temple service.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rava elaborates: The condition that improper intent disqualifies only when expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the intent of a blemished priest, who is disqualified from performing the Temple service. The condition that it disqualifies only when expressed with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the omer meal offering, which is generally unfit for the Temple service, as it is a novelty, in that it is brought from barley whereas most meal offerings are brought from wheat. And finally, the condition that it disqualifies only when expressed in a place that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude sacrificial rites that were performed with improper intent while the altar was damaged. At such a time improper intent does not disqualify an offering, and therefore if the altar is repaired on the same day, the offering may be sacrificed upon the altar.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The Gemara discusses the prohibition against sacrificing an item that is prohibited to the Jewish people. The Sages taught in a baraita: It is derived from a passage in the Torah that discusses burnt offerings: “You shall bring your offering from the cattle, even from the herd or from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2), that certain animals are prohibited for sacrifice upon the altar (see Temura 28a). When it states later, in the next verse: “If his offering is a burnt offering of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), this is difficult, as there is no need for the verse to state this, as it was already written earlier. Rather, this serves to exclude an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa] from being brought as an offering.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The baraita questions the need for this derivation: But could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference? And if a blemished animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person [lehedyot] for consumption, is nevertheless prohibited as an offering for the Most High (see Leviticus 22:19), then certainly with regard to a tereifa, which is forbidden to an ordinary person for consumption (see Exodus 22:30), is it not logical that it is prohibited for the Most High? The baraita responds: Fat [ḥelev] and blood prove that this a fortiori inference is not valid, as they are forbidden to an ordinary person and yet they are permitted for the Most High.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The baraita rejects this suggestion: What is notable about fat and blood? They are notable in that they come from an item that is generally permitted, i.e., the animal from which they come is itself permitted for consumption. Will you say the same with regard to a tereifa, which is entirely forbidden for eating, and therefore should not be permitted for the Most High?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The baraita responds: The pinching of bird offerings will prove that one cannot derive by means of an a fortiori inference that a tereifa is disqualified. As a bird killed by the pinching of its nape is also entirely forbidden, and yet although it is forbidden for consumption to an ordinary person, as it is rendered a carcass, it is nevertheless permitted for the Most High, as bird offerings are killed by the pinching of their napes. The verse is therefore necessary to disqualify a tereifa.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The baraita rejects this suggestion as well: What is notable about pinching? It is notable in that its sanctity prohibits it, i.e., only at the time when it becomes sanctified for the altar does it become prohibited for consumption to an ordinary person, which is at the time of its pinching. But before this time it is not yet prohibited to an ordinary person for consumption. This is not the case with regard to a tereifa, as its sanctity does not prohibit it for consumption, since it is always prohibited to eat it. Accordingly, by logical inference alone one can arrive at the conclusion that a tereifa should not be permitted for the Most High.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The baraita concludes with a statement that will soon be explained: And if you have responded, i.e., if you succeeded in rejecting the a fortiori inference, then when the verse states later: “Of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), as there is no need for the verse to state this phrase, it serves to exclude a tereifa.