Traité Menachot

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: The tanna of that baraita relies on the phrase: “This is the law of the burnt offering [ha’ola]: It is that which goes up on its firewood upon the altar all night unto the morning” (Leviticus 6:2), a seemingly superfluous general phrase which is interpreted homiletically to include the halakha that any item that ascends [ola] upon the altar shall not descend from it, even if it was disqualified. The verse is the actual source for the halakha of the baraita, whereas the case of a private altar is cited merely in support of this ruling. Accordingly, the baraita does not contradict the opinion of Rav Shimi bar Ashi.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The Gemara cites another discussion concerning the sheep of Shavuot. Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught a baraita before Rav: In a case of the two sheep of Shavuot where one slaughtered them for the sake of rams and not for their own sake, they are valid offerings, but they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner, i.e., the community, to sacrifice these offerings. Rav said to Rabba bar bar Ḥana: That is not so; rather, the sheep certainly satisfy the obligation of the community.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Ḥisda said: The statement of Rav is reasonable in a case where one thought that they were rams when he slaughtered them, and nevertheless slaughtered them for the sake of lambs. In such a case, it makes sense that they satisfy the community’s obligation since the lambs were slaughtered for the sake of lambs.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : But in a case where he thought that they were rams when he slaughtered them, and therefore slaughtered them for the sake of rams, they do not satisfy the community’s obligation, even though they were actually lambs. This is due to the fact that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, despite the fact that it was done in error. But Rabba said: The erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering does not constitute uprooting.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rava said: We raise an objection to our own ruling concerning this halakha from that which was taught in a mishna (Gittin 54a): In a case of priests who disqualified an offering through improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention to eat it after the appropriate time, if they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering. It follows, therefore, that if the priests did so unintentionally they are exempt. And it is taught concerning this case in a baraita: Even though they slaughtered it with improper intent unintentionally, their act of improper intention renders the offering piggul, despite the fact that they are exempt from paying damages.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : What are the circumstances in which this is the halakha? If we say that it is referring to a case where the priest knew that the offering was a sin offering, which is eaten for only one day and one night, and nevertheless he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, and thereby his intention was that it be eaten after its appropriate time, is this considered an unintentional act by the priests? Certainly they were acting intentionally.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, is it not referring to a case where the offering was a sin offering, which is eaten for only one day and one night, and the priest thought that it was a peace offering and therefore he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, and thereby his intention was that it be eaten after its appropriate time? And with regard to this case the tanna taught: Their act of improper intention renders the offering piggul. Apparently, this proves that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, contrary to the ruling of Rabba.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Abaye said to Rava: There is no objection from this baraita, because actually it is referring to a case where the priest knew that it was a sin offering and nevertheless he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, and his uprooting was done intentionally. Nevertheless, the baraita refers to the priests as acting unintentionally because it is referring to circumstances where the priest says, i.e., he mistakenly thinks, that it is permitted to sacrifice the offering with this intent.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to Rabba’s opinion that erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering does not constitute uprooting. A baraita teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which the handful was removed not for their sake are entirely valid, and have even satisfied the obligation of the owner, unlike animal offerings slaughtered not for their sake, which do not satisfy the obligation of the owner.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : This is because meal offerings are not similar to animal offerings. As, in the case of one who removes a handful from a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, its mode of preparation proves that it is a shallow-pan meal offering and not a deep-pan meal offering. Since a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan is hard and one prepared in a deep pan is soft, his intention is plainly false. Similarly, if one removes a handful from a dry meal offering, the meal offering of a sinner, which has no oil, for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, his intention is plainly false, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a dry meal offering.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : But with regard to animal offerings this is not so. There is one mode of slaughter for all of the offerings, one mode of collection of the blood for all of them, and one mode of sprinkling for all of them. Since the only factor that distinguishes between one type of offering and another is the intention of the individuals involved in its sacrifice, their intention is significant. Consequently, if one of the sacrificial rites is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances to which Rabbi Shimon is referring? If we say that he is referring to a case where the priest knew that the meal offering was prepared in a shallow pan, and nevertheless he removed a handful from it for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, then although its mode of preparation proves that it was prepared in a shallow pan, what of it? In any case he is consciously uprooting its status as a shallow-pan meal offering, changing it to a deep-pan meal offering by means of his intention when he removes the handful.