Traité Menachot

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says that meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings? He means that they are not similar to most slaughtered offerings. There are, however, certain slaughtered offerings whose preparation, which is unique to that particular offering, is proof that it is that offering. In those instances, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the offerings fulfill the obligations of their respective owners despite the improper intent.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that a meal offering that was sacrificed not for its own sake fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a meal offering. There, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rava elaborates: If one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering he fulfills his obligation, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7). This indicates that there is one law for all the meal offerings, i.e., they are all considered variations of the same offering, and are different only with regard to how they should be sacrificed ab initio. Conversely, if one sacrificed a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering, since the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written anywhere, there is no reason to conclude that one fulfills his obligation under such circumstances.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara questions how Rava can say that the verse “And this is the law of the meal offering” serves as the basis for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the tanna, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though sacrificing a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering is a case where it is not recognizable that the intention fits the offering, i.e., the intent does not match the rites being performed, and the offering should therefore be disqualified, the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” which teaches that there is one law for all the meal offerings.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says: But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so? This clause indicates that the similarity between the rites of various slaughtered offerings is a reason why they should not be valid, whereas according to the above reasoning the opposite is so.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara explains this part of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Even though there is one manner of slaughter for all animal offerings, and therefore one might think that the owner has fulfilled his obligation despite the improper intent, the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written. In other words, it is not stated: This is the law of a slaughtered offering, in the manner that a verse states: “This is the law of the meal offering.” Therefore, the owner of a slaughtered offering does not fulfill his obligation if there is improper intent, notwithstanding the similarity between the acts of slaughter.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the phrase “And this is the law of the meal offering” teaches that a meal offering is not disqualified despite the improper intent for a different meal offering, then analogously, a sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood, or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship, or for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite, or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper should be valid and effect acceptance. As the Merciful One states: “And this is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), from which it should be derived that there is one law for all sin offerings.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, such a sin offering is indeed valid and effects acceptance for its owner. The Gemara notes: According to the Rabbis, Rava says: A sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship is valid. But if he slaughtered it for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper it is disqualified, as with regard to these offerings, there are burnt offerings brought together with them.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches that Rava holds that the halakha in all of these cases is disqualification of the sin offering. The reason is that the verse states: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). The word “it” indicates that it must be sacrificed for the sake of that particular sin offering, and it may not be slaughtered for the sake of a different one.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The Gemara cites a third resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Ashi said that it is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the obligation of the owner, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel and not the offering. There, where it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Ashi elaborates: When one bringing a pan meal offering states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, he has intent only with regard to the type of vessel, and intention with regard to the type of vessel does not disqualify offerings, as he is not sacrificing the vessel, and therefore the owner’s obligation is fulfilled. By contrast, when he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, he has intent with regard to the type of meal offering, which improper intention does disqualify. Consequently, the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara questions how Rav Ashi can maintain that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the tanna, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though when he removes a handful from a pan meal offering explicitly for the sake of a deep pan, it is a case where the falseness of the intention is recognizable and the offering should therefore be disqualified, it is nevertheless valid and fulfills the owner’s obligation, as intentions with regard to the vessel are irrelevant.