Traité Menachot

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: This is not considered recognizably false intent, as people might say: Perhaps it is actually a sin offering and he has already sprinkled its blood below the red line. And as for the fact that he squeezed its blood above the red line, they will say: It is the squeezing that follows sprinkling, which may be performed above the red line in the case of a sin offering. As the Master said: If one squeezed the blood of a bird sin offering in any place on the altar, the offering is valid. Since people might erroneously think that this bird is actually a sin offering, this intent is not considered recognizably false, so the offering is disqualified.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks another question: According to Rabba’s resolution, a bird sin offering whose blood a priest sprinkled below the red line for the sake of a bird burnt offering should effect acceptance, as the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird sin offering. Because if it is in fact a bird burnt offering, he would have performed it above the red line, and he would have performed the act of squeezing instead of sprinkling.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: Indeed, according to Rabbi Shimon such a bird offering effects acceptance and fulfills the obligation of the owner. In fact, bird offerings were not discussed by Rabbi Shimon at all. Rather, he said: Because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings, which means that they are not similar to slaughtered animal offerings, but he did not say that they are not similar to bird offerings.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: But if so, then offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple courtyard, which is a requirement that applies only to offerings of the most sacred order, for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, should effect acceptance for their owners, as the actions performed on them prove that they are offerings of the most sacred order. Because if they are in fact offerings of lesser sanctity, he would have performed their slaughter in the southern part of the Temple courtyard.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: The slaughter of an offering in the northern part of the Temple courtyard is not indicative of the type of offering one intends it to be, as one can say that the Merciful One states that offerings of lesser sanctity may be slaughtered even in the southern part of the courtyard. Did He say that these offerings must be slaughtered specifically in the southern part and not in the northern part? This is as we learned in a mishna (Zevaḥim 55a), that the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity may be performed in any place within the Temple courtyard.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: If so, then offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered in the southern part of the Temple courtyard for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order should effect acceptance for their owners, as the actions performed on them prove that they are offerings of lesser sanctity. Because if they are in fact offerings of the most sacred order, he would have performed their slaughter in the northern part of the Temple courtyard.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: The fact that an offering was slaughtered in the southern part of the Temple courtyard is not a clear indication that it was intended as an offering of lesser sanctity, as people might say: They are in fact offerings of the most sacred order, but the priest transgressed the mitzva to slaughter them in the northern part of the courtyard and slaughtered them in the southern part.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if people might suspect an individual of performing the rite of an offering in an improper manner, then if a priest removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering as well, one who sees that this priest removes a handful for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering might say: This owner took a vow to bring a meal offering in a deep pan, and as for the fact that he brings it in a pan, it is actually the meal offering of a deep pan and the owner transgressed the mitzva to bring it in a deep pan, and brought it in a pan. Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon maintain that such a meal offering satisfies the obligation of its owner?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara explains: There, where the priest removed the handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, even if the owner took a vow to bring a meal offering in a deep pan, when he brings it in a pan it is considered a valid pan meal offering, and therefore the priest’s intention is recognizably false.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : This is as we learned in a mishna (102b): One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a pan, and he brought it in a deep pan, or if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, and he brought it in a pan, the meal offering that he brought, he brought, i.e., it is valid and the priest performs the rites of the meal offering that he actually brought, but he did not fulfill the obligation resulting from his vow, and he must bring another meal offering to fulfill that obligation.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: But even so, the priest’s improper intent remains indiscernible, as people might think: Perhaps the owner said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a pan, and in spite of this he brought it in a deep pan. Such a meal offering is disqualified and is not considered a valid pan meal offering, as we learned in that same mishna: One who took a vow, saying: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a pan, and he brought it in a deep pan, or if he vowed: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a deep pan, and he brought it in a pan, it is disqualified, as he did not fulfill his vow. If so, how can Rabbi Shimon say that such a meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, when the intent is not recognizably false?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: According to the Rabbis, i.e., according to the opinion of the mishna just cited, there is indeed a difficulty. But according to Rabbi Shimon there is no difficulty, since with regard to a case where one took a vow, saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a pan meal offering, and then he brought it in a deep pan, Rabbi Shimon says: He has fulfilled even the obligation resulting from his vow. Evidently, the designation of the vessel for a meal offering is nothing according to Rabbi Shimon, and there is no difference in this regard whether he said: This is for a particular type of meal offering, and there is no difference whether he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a particular meal offering. In both instances the unique actions of each particular meal offering prove its identity, and therefore the owner fulfills his obligation regardless of the priest’s improper intent.