Traité Menachot

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : and yet Rabbi Yosei said that the remainder is rendered piggul; then here, where he has intent to partake of the right thigh the next day, which is part of the offering itself, is it not all the more so that both thighs should become piggul?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Yosei holds that intent of piggul with regard to one thigh renders the other thigh piggul as well, as they are of one body. Similarly, with regard to two loaves, Rabbi Yosei is of the opinion that if one intends to consume an amount equal to an olive-bulk from both loaves, both loaves are rendered piggul. And as for his statement that intent of piggul with regard to one loaf does not render the other loaf piggul, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei: The verse renders the two loaves one body, and the verse also renders them two bodies. The verse renders them one body in the sense that they preclude one another, i.e., neither loaf is valid without the other. The verse also renders them two bodies, as the Merciful One states: This loaf is prepared alone and that is prepared alone, i.e., the kneading and arrangement of each loaf must be performed separately.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Therefore, if the priest mixed them together by intending to consume an olive-bulk from both of them, then they are mixed and they are both piggul, as the verse renders them one body. But if he separated them by having intent with regard to only one loaf, in that case they are separated and only that loaf is piggul, as the verse renders them two bodies.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: If one had intent of piggul with regard to one type of loaf from the loaves of a thanks offering, what is the halakha concerning the remaining types of loaves, i.e., are they rendered piggul as well? Similarly, if one had intent of piggul with regard to either the loaves or the wafers of baked meal offerings, what is the halakha with regard to the remaining type? Rav Taḥlifa from the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, taught him a baraita that states: And likewise you say with regard to the bread of a thanks offering, and likewise you say with regard to a baked meal offering, that the halakha is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The Sages taught in a baraita: If at the time of the slaughter of an offering one had intent to consume half an olive-bulk of its meat the next day, and at the time of the sprinkling of the blood he had intent to consume half of another olive-bulk of meat the next day, the offering is piggul, as intentions that occur during the slaughter and sprinkling combine to render an offering piggul.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : There is a dispute between amora’im with regard to the halakha of this baraita: Some say that in the case of intentions that occur specifically during the slaughter and sprinkling, as both of them are permitting factors of the offering, yes, the intentions combine. But intentions that occur during the collection of the blood in a service vessel and the conveying of the blood to the altar do not combine, as neither rite is a permitting factor. And some say that if intentions during those rites that are distant from one another, i.e., the slaughter and sprinkling, combine, all the more so intentions during these rites that are close to one another, i.e., collection and conveying, certainly combine.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: Is that so, i.e., that intentions during the slaughter and sprinkling combine? But Levi teaches in a baraita: Intentions that occur during the four sacrificial rites do not combine to render an offering piggul, and those rites are: Slaughter and sprinkling, collection and conveying. Rava said: It is not difficult; this statement of Levi is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, whereas that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the two loaves and two lambs sacrificed on Shavuot: With regard to one who slaughters one of the lambs brought as peace offerings on Shavuot with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from this loaf the next day, and similarly, he slaughtered the other lamb with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from that second loaf the next day, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that this offering is valid. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that intentions that occur during the performance of two permitting factors do not combine to render an offering piggul.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Abaye said to Rava: You can say that you have heard that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that intentions do not combine to render an offering piggul when each intention is concerning half a permitting factor and half a measure of consumption, i.e., one lamb and half an olive-bulk. But in a case where one had intentions during the performance of an entire permitting factor, i.e., during the slaughter and sprinkling, and concerning half a measure of consumption, did you hear him say that such intentions do not combine?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: But if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is of the opinion that intentions during the performance of an entire permitting factor and concerning half a measure of consumption combine to render an offering piggul, why does he rule that when one slaughters each lamb with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from one loaf the next day the offering is entirely valid? Let him decree that intentions during half a permitting factor and concerning half a measure of consumption disqualify an offering, due to the fact that intentions during an entire permitting factor and concerning half a measure of consumption render the offering piggul, as one finds in similar instances that Rabbi Yosei decreed and the Rabbis decreed in this manner.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rava bar Rav Ḥanan elaborates: Rabbi Yosei decreed in such a case, as we learned in a mishna (13a): With regard to one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to burn its handful on the next day, everyone agrees that the meal offering is piggul. But if his intent was to burn its frankincense on the next day, Rabbi Yosei says: The meal offering is unfit, but partaking of it does not include liability to receive karet. And the Rabbis say: It is a case of piggul and one is liable to receive karet for partaking of the meal offering. Since one is not liable to receive karet, Rabbi Yosei evidently disqualifies the meal offering as a rabbinic decree due to concern over a case where his intention was to burn the handful the next day.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And the Rabbis decreed as well, as we learned in a mishna (16a): If one had intent of piggul during the burning of the handful but not during the burning of the frankincense, or if he had such intent during the burning of the frankincense but not during the burning of the handful, Rabbi Meir says: The meal offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for its consumption, and the Rabbis say: There is no liability to receive karet for its consumption unless he has intent of piggul during the burning of the entire permitting factor, i.e., both the handful and the frankincense. Since the Rabbis state that there is no liability to receive karet, but they do not rule that the offering is valid, evidently they maintain that the offering is disqualified by rabbinic law, due to concern over a case of piggul intent during the burning of the entire permitting factor.