Guémara
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. In that case the vessel cannot contract ritual impurity until the craftsman has finished working on it. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish finds this difficult for the following reason: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought. This halakha indicates that a statement does not nullify a previous statement.
מַעֲשֶׂה מוֹצִיא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה, מַחְשָׁבָה אֵין מוֹצִיאָה לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה לָא מַפְּקָה, דְּלָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה מִיהָא תַּפֵּיק!
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: With regard to the halakha that produce must become wet in order for it to contract ritual impurity, the verse states: “But if water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls upon it, it is impure” (Leviticus 11:38). The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, “ki yuttan,” which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled?
שָׁאנֵי מַחְשָׁבָה דְּטוּמְאָה, דְּכִי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, וְכִדְרַב פָּפָּא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא רָמֵי: כְּתִיב: ״כִּי יִתֵּן״, וְקָרֵינַן: ״כִּי יוּתַּן״. הָא כֵּיצַד?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Pappa explains that the standard of “if water is placed [ki yuttan]” is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term “is placed [yuttan]” means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. This is proof that thought is equivalent to action with regard to ritual impurity, as if one is satisfied with the produce becoming wet it is considered as though he actively placed the water himself. By the same reasoning, thought which renders a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity is powerful enough to require an action to counteract its effect.
״כִּי יוּתַּן״ דֻּומְיָא ״דְּכִי יִתֵּן״. מָה ״יִתֵּן״ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ, אַף ״יוּתַּן״, דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara presents another version of the discussion: Rav Zevid taught this dispute with regard to this halakha: And similarly, in a case where she gave permission to her agent to accept betrothal for her and she subsequently went and accepted betrothal herself from someone else, if her betrothal came first, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, but if the betrothal of her agent came first, her betrothal is not a betrothal.
רַב זְבִיד מַתְנֵי לְהָא שְׁמַעְתְּתָא אַהָא: וְכֵן הִיא שֶׁנָּתְנָה רְשׁוּת לִשְׁלוּחָהּ לְקַדְּשָׁהּ, וְהָלְכָה הִיא וְקִדְּשָׁהּ אֶת עַצְמָהּ, אִם שֶׁלָּהּ קָדְמוּ – קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין, וְאִם שֶׁל שְׁלוּחָהּ קָדְמוּ – אֵין קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Sages discuss this halakha: If she did not accept betrothal herself and retracted her appointment of the agent, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: She can retract her appointment; and Reish Lakish says: She cannot retract her appointment. The Gemara clarifies their respective opinions. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She can retract her appointment, as a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement, by which she appointed the agent. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her appointment, as a statement does not come and nullify a previous statement.
לֹא קִדְּשָׁהּ אֶת עַצְמָהּ וְחָזְרָה בָּהּ, מַהוּ? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חוֹזֶרֶת, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חוֹזֶרֶת, אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת, לָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from the aforementioned mishna (Terumot 3:4) with regard to one who appointed an agent to separate teruma on his behalf and subsequently canceled the agency: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated teruma, his teruma is not teruma. This shows that a statement nullifies a previous statement. Rava says: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the homeowner preceded the agent and separated teruma from his heap himself, which is an action, and an action certainly nullifies a statement.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בִּיטֵּל, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא תָּרַם בִּיטֵּל – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה! אָמַר רָבָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּדַם בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וְתָרַם אֶת כִּרְיוֹ, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish explains his objection: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כׇּל הַכֵּלִים יוֹרְדִים לִידֵי טוּמְאָתָן בְּמַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין עוֹלִין מִטּוּמְאָתָן אֶלָּא בְּשִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה. מַעֲשֶׂה מוֹצִיא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה, מַחְשָׁבָה אֵינָהּ מוֹצִיאָה לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה לָא מַפְּקָה, לָא אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא מִיַּד מַחְשָׁבָה מִיהָא תַּפֵּיק!
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Yet we read it “ki yuttan.” How so? The standard of “if water is placed [ki yuttan]” is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term “is placed [yuttan]” means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי מַחְשָׁבָה דְּטוּמְאָה דְּכִי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, וְכִדְרַב פָּפָּא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא רָמֵי: כְּתִיב: ״כִּי יִתֵּן״, וְקָרֵינַן: ״כִּי יוּתַּן״. הָא כֵּיצַד? ״כִּי יוּתַּן״ דֻּומְיָא ״דָּיִתֵּן״, מָה ״יִתֵּן״ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ אַף ״יוּתַּן״ נָמֵי דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. This indicates that the appointment of an agent can be nullified even by a statement. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish is in fact a conclusive refutation.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהִגִּיעַ בַּשָּׁלִיחַ אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁלַח אַחֲרָיו שָׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״גֵּט שֶׁנָּתַתִּי לְךָ בָּטֵל הוּא״ – הֲרֵי זֶה בָּטֵל תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, תְּיוּבְתָּא.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara adds: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and this is even according to the first version of their dispute, with regard to a woman who retracts from her betrothal after accepting the money for it. And even though there is room to say that giving money to a woman for betrothal is different, as it is considered like an action, even so, a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement with regard to her consent to the betrothal, provided that the betrothal has yet to take effect.
וְהִילְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקַמַּיְיתָא. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: שָׁאנֵי נְתִינַת מָעוֹת לְיַד אִשָּׁה דִּכְמַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי אָתֵי דִּיבּוּר וּמְבַטֵּל דִּיבּוּר.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: The halakha recorded here is difficult with regard to the halakha recorded elsewhere. You said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and yet we maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman. As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha in the case of a bill of divorce sent by an agent that the husband nullified before it was received by his wife? Can the husband return and divorce his wife with the very same bill of divorce?
קַשְׁיָא הִילְכְתָא אַהִילְכְתָא. אָמְרַתְּ: הִילְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְקַיְימָא לַן הִילְכְתָא כְּרַב נַחְמָן, דְּאִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחֲזוֹר וִיגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Naḥman says: He can return and divorce her with it, and Rav Sheshet says: He cannot return and divorce her with it. And we maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman in this case. By contrast, according to the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, since the husband has nullified the bill of divorce it should no longer be valid. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as, although the husband has nullified the agent from his status as an agent, he has not nullified the bill of divorce itself from its status as a bill of divorce.
רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: חוֹזֵר וּמְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ, רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ. וְקַיְימָא לַן הִילְכְתָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן! נְהִי דְּבַטְּלֵיהּ מִתּוֹרַת שְׁלִיחַ, מִתּוֹרַת גֵּט לָא בַּטְּלֵיהּ.