Guémara
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : let us derive a principle from misuse of consecrated property, that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not done, because misuse of consecrated property and the slaughter or sale of a stolen cow or sheep are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to apply to other cases. The Gemara clarifies: The verse pertaining to misuse of consecrated property is that which we said, but what is the verse with regard to slaughter or sale? The verse states: “And he slaughters it or sells it” (Exodus 21:37), juxtaposing selling to slaughtering: Just as a sale is necessarily performed by means of another, since every transaction involves two parties, so too slaughter can likewise be performed by means of another, and the thief is liable even if the act of slaughtering is performed by his agent.
נֵילַף מִינֵּיהּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה מְעִילָה טְבִיחָה וּמְכִירָה שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד, וְכֹל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין. מְעִילָה – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן, טְבִיחָה וּמְכִירָה מַאי הִיא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּטְבָחוֹ אוֹ מְכָרוֹ״ – מָה מְכִירָה עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, אַף טְבִיחָה עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara quotes two other explanations. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the word “or” in the verse “and he slaughters it or sells it,” serves to include an agent. The school of Ḥizkiyya taught: When the verse states with regard to sale or slaughter: “He shall pay five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep” (Exodus 21:37), repetition of the word “for” is superfluous and serves to include an agent. It teaches that the one who appointed the agent is liable for the action of the agent.
דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״אוֹ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ. דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה תָּנָא: ״תַּחַת״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent that applies to other cases, but according to the one who said that two verses do teach a precedent, what can be said? Why not derive from the case of misuse of consecrated property and that of slaughter or sale that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression? The Gemara answers: The Merciful One reveals in the Torah that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression in the case of an offering slaughtered outside the Temple, as it states: “It shall be considered blood for that [hahu] man; he has spilled blood” (Leviticus 17:4). The emphasis of “that man” teaches that he is liable for his actions, but he is not liable for the actions of his agent.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? גַּלִּי רַחֲמָנָא בִּשְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב לָאִישׁ הַהוּא דָּם שָׁפָךְ״ – הוּא וְלֹא שְׁלוּחוֹ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression with regard to the prohibition of offerings slaughtered outside. From where do we derive that this halakha applies to the entire Torah? The Gemara answers: It is derived as a principle from the case of offerings slaughtered outside, by means of analogy.
אַשְׁכְּחַן גַּבֵּי שְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה מְנָלַן? דְּיָלֵיף מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: But before deriving that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression from the case of offerings slaughtered outside, let us derive the halakha from these other cases, i.e., misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale, where the halakha is that an agent can be appointed to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One again writes in that same verse in connection to the prohibition of slaughtering offerings outside the Temple: “And that [hahu] man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). If the halakha derived from the emphasis of the word hahu written in this part of the verse is not needed for this matter itself, since the verse already taught that he is liable only for his own act and not for that of his agent, apply it to the matter of the entire Torah, so that one is held liable only for one’s own actions and not for those of an agent.
אַדְּיָלֵיף מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, נֵילַיף מֵהָנָךְ! הֲדַר כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא: ״וְנִכְרַת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא״ – אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְגוּפוֹ, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent, and there is no reason to learn from the misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale that one can appoint an agent to perform a transgression, what does he interpret those terms: “That man” and: “That man” to be teaching? Since he does not need to counter a derivation from the two verses, he should not require them to teach that one cannot appoint an agent to perform a transgression. The Gemara answers: One of them serves to exclude from liability the case of two who hold a knife and slaughter an offering outside together. And the other one emphasizes: “That man” is liable, but not one who is compelled to slaughter the animal; “that man” is liable, but not one who does so unwittingly; and “that man” is liable, and not one who was mistaken, e.g., one who did not know that the animal was an offering. In order to be liable one must have acted with full awareness and completely willingly.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִים, הָנֵי ״הָהוּא״ ״הָהוּא״ מַאי דָּרֵישׁ בְּהוּ? חַד, לְמַעוֹטֵי שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאוֹחֲזִים בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִים, וְחַד, ״הוּא״ – וְלֹא אָנוּס, ״הוּא״ – וְלֹא שׁוֹגֵג, ״הוּא״ – וְלֹא מוּטְעֶה.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: And how does the other opinion, i.e., the one who holds that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, which derives from the word “that [hahu]” that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression, derive these halakhot? The Gemara answers: He derives them from the fact that the pronoun “hahu” is composed of two parts, the article ha, meaning: The, and the pronoun hu, meaning: He. He derives halakhot both from “hu” and from the additional article in “hahu.” Therefore, he is able to derive both the principle that an agent cannot be appointed to perform a transgression and the halakhot of two that slaughter and one who acts without full awareness. And the other opinion, i.e., the one who holds that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent, which derives these halakhot from the entire word “hahu,” does not interpret the variation from “hu” to “hahu.” He holds that one cannot derive separate halakhot from each part of this word.
וְאִידָּךְ? מֵ״הוּא״ ״הָהוּא״. וְאִידָּךְ? ״הוּא״ ״הַהוּא״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara questions the statement that there is no agency for transgressions: But there is that which is taught in a baraita: One who says to his agent: Go kill a person, he, the killer, is liable if he kills, and the one who appointed him is exempt. Shammai the Elder says in the name of Haggai the prophet: The one who appointed him is liable, as it stated with regard to David, who directed Joab to kill Uriah: “Him you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon” (II Samuel 12:9). David was held responsible for the death of Uriah.
וְהָא דְּתָנֵי: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״צֵא הֲרוֹג אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ״, הוּא – חַיָּיב, וְשׁוֹלְחָיו – פָּטוּר. שַׁמַּאי הַזָּקֵן אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם חַגַּי הַנָּבִיא: שׁוֹלְחָיו חַיָּיב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֹתוֹ הָרַגְתָּ בְּחֶרֶב בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן״.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Shammai the Elder? How can he say that there is agency for transgression? The Gemara answers: He holds that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and therefore he learns from the two cases of misuse of consecrated property and slaughter or sale that there is agency for transgression. And as for the derivation from one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple, which teaches that there is no agent for transgression, Shammai does not interpret the variation from “hu” to “hahu.” And if you wish, say instead: Actually it is possible that he does interpret the variation, and he agrees that there is no agent for transgression. And what is the meaning of Shammai’s statement that the one who appoints him is liable? It means he is liable according to the laws of Heaven, although he cannot be punished by a human court.
מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּשַׁמַּאי הַזָּקֵן? קָסָבַר: שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד מְלַמְּדִין, וְ״הוּא״ ״הַהוּא״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם דָּרֵישׁ, וּמַאי חַיָּיב – חַיָּיב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמַיִם.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that the first tanna holds that he is exempt even according to the laws of Heaven? The one who appointed him must bear some responsibility. Rather, the first tanna also agrees that the one who appointed the killer is liable according to the laws of Heaven, and the difference between them pertains to a great judgment and a small judgment. According to Shammai, his liability is great, to the extent that Heaven considers him fully responsible, whereas the first tanna holds that his liability is of a lesser degree.
מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אֲפִילּוּ מִדִּינֵי שָׁמַיִם נָמֵי פָּטוּר?! אֶלָּא: דִּינָא רַבָּה וְדִינָא זוּטָא אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And if you wish, say instead: Everyone agrees that there is no agent for transgression. Nevertheless, Shammai holds that there, with regard to killing, it is different, since the Merciful One reveals: “Him you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon,” explicitly rendering David accountable for this transgression and indicating that killing is different from all other transgressions.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּגַלִּי רַחֲמָנָא: ״אֹתוֹ הָרַגְתָּ בְּחֶרֶב בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן״.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And the other opinion, i.e., the first tanna, who holds that the one who appoints the killer is exempt, explains the verse as follows: Behold this killing is for you like the sword of Ammon. Just as you are not punished for those killed by the sword of Ammon in the course of the war, so too you are not punished for the death of Uriah the Hittite, not even according to the laws of Heaven. What is the reason for this? Uriah was a rebel against the monarchy and was consequently liable to the death penalty, as he said to King David: “And my lord Joab, and the servants of my lord, are encamped in the open field” (II Samuel 11:11). By referring to Joab as his lord in front of the king, he indicated that he answered to Joab rather than to the king, which is tantamount to rebellion.
וְאִידַּךְ: הֲרֵי לְךָ כְּחֶרֶב בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן, מָה חֶרֶב בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן – אֵין אַתָּה נֶעֱנָשׁ עָלָיו, אַף אוּרִיָּה הַחִתִּי – אִי אַתָּה נֶעֱנָשׁ עָלָיו. מַאי טַעְמָא – מוֹרֵד בַּמַּלְכוּת הֲוָה, דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ: ״וַאדֹנִי יוֹאָב וְעַבְדֵי אֲדֹנִי עַל פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה חֹנִים״.