Traité Gittin

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And what is the reason that the Sages said that if it is known that the sin-offering was obtained through robbery, it does not effect atonement? It is so that people not say that the altar consumes stolen property.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara attempts to clarify the two explanations. Granted, according to the opinion of Ulla, that the concern stems from the fact that the priests will be distraught, this is the reason that the tanna teaches the halakha with regard to a sin-offering: The priests partake of the meat of a sin-offering. If they find out that they ate an animal that was forbidden to them, i.e., an offering slaughtered counter to halakha, they are likely to become distraught. But according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, that the concern is about the honor of the altar, why does the mishna mention specifically the case of a sin-offering; shouldn’t the same concern apply to a burnt-offering, as well, as it too is burned on the altar?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: The mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and the mishna should be understood as follows: It is not necessary to teach the halakha in the case of a burnt-offering, which is entirely consumed on the altar. In that case, people will certainly say that the altar consumes stolen property. But even in the case of a sin-offering, where only the fat and the blood go up to be consumed on the altar and the rest is consumed by the priests, even so they issued a decree and said that the stolen sin-offering does not effect atonement, so that people should not say that the altar consumes stolen property.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara further clarifies the two understandings: We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda testified about a sin-offering that had been obtained through robbery but that is not publicly known to have been obtained in that manner, and said that it effects atonement for the robber who sacrifices it, for the benefit of the altar. Granted, according to the opinion of Ulla, it works out well, as he understands that the Sages instituted that if it was not publicly known that the sin-offering was obtained through robbery, it does effect atonement. But according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, it should have stated just the opposite, namely, that if it was publicly known that the sin-offering was obtained through robbery, it does not effect atonement.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: That is also what the mishna is saying: If it is not known that the sin-offering was obtained through robbery, it effects atonement, but if this is known, it does not effect atonement, for the benefit of the altar.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rava raises an objection from what was learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 74a): If one stole an animal and consecrated it, and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, he pays double payment like a thief (see Exodus 22:3), but he does not pay fourfold or fivefold payment, as one must ordinarily pay when he slaughters or sells an ox or a sheep that he stole from another person (Exodus 21:37). And it is taught in a baraita with regard to this mishna: If one slaughtered an animal outside the Temple in a case like this, he is punishable by karet for having sacrificed an offering outside the Temple. And if you say that the owner’s despair of recovering an item that was stolen from him does not by itself enable the thief to acquire the stolen item, what is the relevance of mentioning karet? The punishment of karet should not apply, as the thief cannot consecrate an animal that does not belong to him.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Sheizevi said: This means that he is liable to receive karet by rabbinic law. Those who heard this laughed at him. Is there such a thing as karet by rabbinic law? Rava said to them: A great man has spoken, do not laugh at him. What Rav Sheizevi means is karet that comes to him through the words of the Sages, who declared that the thief’s consecration is valid. It is the Sages who placed the animal in his possession, so that he would become liable for it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rava said: Although I agree with Rav Sheizevi, this matter is certainly a dilemma for me. When the Sages placed the animal in his possession, did they do so from the time of the theft or from the time of the consecration? What is the difference between these possibilities? There is a difference with regard to its wool and with regard to its offspring. If the animal was placed in his possession from the time of the theft, the wool that it grows and the offspring that it births are his, and he is not required to return them to the animal’s owner. But if the animal becomes his only when he consecrates it, he is required to return them. What is the halakha? Rava then said, in answer to his own question: It stands to reason that the Sages placed the animal in his possession from the time of the consecration. This is so that the sinner not profit from his crime. Otherwise, the thief would benefit from the rabbinic decree that was instituted to increase his liability.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : MISHNA: The law of Sicarii [Sikarikon] did not apply in Judea in the time that people were being killed in the war. From the time that people were being killed in the war and onward, the law of Sicarii did apply there. What is this law of Sicarii? If one first purchased land from a Sicarius, who extorted the field from its prior owners with threats, and afterward the buyer returned and purchased the same field a second time from the prior landowner, his purchase is void. The prior owner of the field can say that he did not actually mean to sell him the field. By contrast, if he first acquired the field from the prior owner and afterward he returned and purchased the same field from a Sicarius, his purchase stands.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Similarly, if one first purchased from the husband the rights to use a field belonging to his wife, and afterward he returned and purchased the same field from the wife, so that if the husband were to predecease or divorce her, the purchaser would then own it fully, his purchase is void. The woman can claim that she did not wish to quarrel with her husband and to object to the transaction but that in truth she did not agree to the sale. By contrast, if he first acquired the field from the wife, and afterward he returned and purchased the same field from the husband, his purchase stands. This is the initial version of this mishna.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Later, the court of those who came after the Sages who composed that mishna said: With regard to one who purchased a field from a Sicarius, he must give the prior owner one-fourth of the field’s value. When does this apply? At a time when the prior owner is unable to purchase the field himself. But if he is able to purchase it himself, he precedes anyone else.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi later convened a court, and they counted their votes and determined that if the field remained before, i.e., in the possession of, the Sicarius for twelve months, whoever first purchases the field acquires possession of it, but he must give the prior owner one-fourth of the field’s value.