Traité Bava Metzia

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : By contrast, Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, and he explains the verses in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, thereby arriving at the conclusion of the baraita, as it is taught in a baraita: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay” teaches about the case in which the owner was working for the borrower at both points in time, and it also teaches about the case in which he was working for him at one of those times but not at the other one; in both cases the borrower is exempt.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara raises an objection: But it is also written: “If its owner is not with him, he shall pay.” The verse teaches about the case in which the owner was not working for the borrower at either point in time, and it also teaches about the case in which he was working for him at one of those times but not at the other one; in both cases the borrower is liable.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : To reconcile the verses, one must say that the phrase “if its owner is with him” serves to tell you that if the owner was with the borrower, i.e., working for him, at the time of borrowing, then he does not need to be with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he was with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies, he does need to have been with him at the time of borrowing for the exemption to apply.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara raises a difficulty: I could reverse the conclusion and say that the borrower’s exemption from liability is dependent upon the time when the animal was injured or died. The Gemara explains: It is reasonable that the exemption from liability should be dependent on the time of the borrowing because the borrowing is of greater significance, as with it the borrower brings the animal into his domain.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara retorts: On the contrary, the time when the animal is injured or dies is of greater significance, because that point marks when the borrower is actually liable to pay for any accidents that occurred.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: No, the borrowing is more significant. Were it not for the initial borrowing, what liability could be caused by the fact that the animal is injured or dies? The Gemara argues: But by the same logic, were it not for the fact that the animal is injured or dies, what liability could be caused by the act of borrowing? The Gemara concludes: Even so, the borrowing is of greater significance, as with it the borrower is obligated to provide the animal’s sustenance as long as it is entrusted with him.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Ashi said that the halakha that the borrower’s exemption from liability is dependent upon the time of the borrowing can be derived from the verse itself: The verse states: “And when a man borrows from another…he shall pay” (Exodus 22:13). The precise formulation of the verse indicates that he borrowed an item from another, but that other person was not with him, i.e., working for him, at the time. It is only in such a case that that verse concludes: “He shall pay.” By inference, when the other person is working with him, the borrower is exempt. Accordingly, it is clear that the critical moment is the time of the borrowing.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need the continuation of that verse: “Its owner is not with him,” and the next verse: “If its owner is with him”? According to Rav Ashi, the circumstances of the borrower’s liability and exemption can be derived from the beginning of the first verse. The Gemara explains: If it were not for these additional clauses, I would say that this phrase “from another” is simply the usual manner of the verse, and is not to be expounded to teach an exemption. Since the continuation of the verse and the next verse teach the actual exemption from liability, and the apparent contradiction between them raises the question of when the critical moment is, it is apparent that the beginning of the verse was written in order to be expounded, as Rav Ashi did.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If one borrowed an animal in order to engage in bestiality with it, a severe transgression (see Leviticus 18:23), what is the halakha; is the borrower liable for mishaps? The crux of the dilemma is: In order for him to be liable, do we require that the borrowing be for a purpose similar to that for which people typically borrow animals, and since people do not typically borrow animals for this purpose, the borrower is exempt? Or perhaps, what is the reason that a borrower is liable? It is due to the benefit he derives from the animal, and as this borrower, too, has benefit from the animal, he is liable for mishaps.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : A similar question: If one borrowed an item, not to use it but to be seen with it, so that people will assume that he is wealthy, what is the halakha? In order for him to be liable, do we require that he borrow an item of monetary worth, and that exists in this case? Or, perhaps we require that he borrow an item of monetary worth from which he also derives tangible benefit, and that does not exist in this case.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Another question: If one borrowed an item to perform work with it that is worth less than the value of one peruta, what is the halakha? Do we require only that he borrow an item of monetary worth, and that exists in this case? Or, perhaps any benefit derived that is worth less than one peruta is nothing, i.e., it is legally considered to be of no monetary worth, and he is therefore exempt.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Another question: If one borrowed two cows to perform work with them that will be worth the value of one peruta in total, what is the halakha? When appraising the value of the benefit derived, to see if it has monetary worth of one peruta, do we say: Follow the borrower and lender, i.e., appraise how much benefit the borrower received from the lender, and in this case there is benefit of the value of one peruta. Or, perhaps we follow the cows, and in this case, each one of the cows does not provide the borrower with monetary worth of one peruta.