Traité Bava Metzia

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : not at the time of the completion of its work, i.e., while it is still growing; and a laborer who works with produce detached from the ground after the completion of its work, when it is sufficiently processed and therefore subject to tithes; and a laborer who works with an item whose growth is not from the land.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that a laborer may eat from produce attached to the ground, derived? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard, then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure; but you shall not put any in your vessel” (Deuteronomy 23:25). The Gemara asks: We find a source for a vineyard; from where do we derive that a laborer may likewise eat from any other type of produce?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: We derive it from a comparison to the case of a vineyard: Just as a vineyard is unique in that it is an entity whose growth is from the ground, and the laborer eats from it at the time of the completion of its work, i.e., when he is harvesting the grapes, so too with regard to any entity whose growth is from the ground and it is at the time of the completion of its work, a laborer may eat from it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara challenges this derivation: What is notable about a vineyard? It is notable in that the owner of a vineyard is obligated in the mitzva of olelot, the obligation to leave incomplete clusters of grapes for the poor (see Leviticus 19:10). Accordingly, one should not be able to derive the halakha of other types of produce from the halakha of a vineyard. The Gemara explains: We derive the halakha that a laborer may eat from other crops from the halakha that he may eat standing grain. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that he may eat standing grain itself? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “When you come into your neighbor’s standing grain, then you may pluck ears with your hand; but you shall not move a sickle on to your neighbor’s standing grain” (Deuteronomy 23:26).

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: What is notable about standing grain? It is notable in that the owner of dough prepared from grain is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla. The Gemara asks an incidental question: And from where do you know that this standing grain mentioned in the verse is the same standing grain whose owner is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla? Perhaps the Merciful One is discussing any standing produce, not only the five grains from which ḥalla must be separated.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: The matter is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term “standing” written here and the term “standing” written elsewhere. It is written here: “When you come into your neighbor’s standing grain” (Deuteronomy 23:26), and it is written there, with regard to harvesting the barley for the omer offering: “Seven weeks you shall count for yourself; from the time the sickle is first put to the standing grain” (Deuteronomy 16:9). Just as there, in the verse referring to the harvesting of the omer, it is the owner of standing grain who is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla, as barley is one of the five grains, so too here, with regard to a laborer, it is discussing standing grain whose owner is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara resumes its discussion by reiterating its earlier question. The comparison between standing grain and other produce can be refuted as follows: What is notable about standing grain? It is notable in that the owner of dough prepared from grain is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla. The Gemara answers: Let the case of a vineyard prove that this comparison is valid, as the mitzva of ḥalla does not apply to the produce of a vineyard, and yet a laborer may eat from it. The Gemara asks: What is notable about a vineyard? It is notable in that its owner is obligated in the mitzva of olelot. The Gemara responds: Let the case of standing grain prove that this is not a decisive factor, as its owner is not obligated in the mitzva of olelot and even so a laborer may eat from it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Since no exact comparison can be drawn to either a vineyard or standing grain alone, the Gemara suggests a combined solution: The inference has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case, a vineyard, is not like the aspect of that case, standing grain. Their common denominator is that each one grows from the earth and at the time of the completion of its work the laborer may eat from it. So too, with regard to any type of produce that grows from the earth, at the time of the completion of its work, a laborer may eat from it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: What is unique about their common denominator? It is unique in that they have an aspect relating to the altar, i.e., the products of both a vineyard and standing grain differ from other types of produce in that they are both offered on the altar. Wine is brought for libations and flour in meal-offerings. The Gemara suggests tangentially: An olive should also be derived through this category of those products which a laborer may eat, as it too has an aspect relating to the altar, in the oil of meal-offerings.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara refutes this suggestion: And is the halakha of an olive derived from the common factor of the two types of produce mentioned earlier? But it itself is called the fruit of a vineyard [kerem], as it is written: “And he burned up both the piles of produce and the standing grain, and also the olive yards [kerem zayit]” (Judges 15:5). Rav Pappa said: This verse does not mean that an olive is considered the product of a vineyard, as in the verse it is called olive yard [kerem zayit], and it is not called a plain vineyard. Therefore, the halakha of olives must be derived by analogy from the common denominator.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara resumes its discussion: In any case, it is difficult, as there still has not been found a source according to which the halakha that a laborer may eat when he is working applies to all types of produce. Rather, Shmuel said: The verse states with regard to a laborer who may eat produce: “But you shall not move a sickle” (Deuteronomy 23:26). This serves to include all types of produce that are cut with a sickle.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: But this word “sickle” is necessary to teach a different halakha with regard to a laborer: At the time of the sickle, i.e., when the work has been completed and the produce is being picked, you may eat. But when it is not yet the time of the sickle, you may not eat. If so, how can Shmuel use the term “sickle” as the source for the halakha that a laborer may eat all kinds of produce that are cut with a sickle?