Traité Bava Metzia

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, what have you to say to explain why one is not required to tithe his flock in a case where a counted animal jumped back into the pen? The Merciful One states: “And all the tithe of the herd or the flock, anyone that passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:32), from which it is derived that a certain tenth animal must be tithed, but not an uncertain tenth, i.e., an animal that is not certainly the tenth. Here too, the entire flock is exempt from tithe because the Merciful One states that a certain tenth animal must be designated as tithe and not an uncertain tenth, i.e., an animal that is not certainly subject to tithe. Therefore, there is proof from the baraita that if a priest seizes an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain, the court removes it from his possession.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: What are these animals of uncertain status that that are subject to tithe according to the mishna? If we say that the reference is to animals whose status as firstborns is uncertain, the Merciful One states: “The tenth shall be sacred to the Lord,” indicating that the tithe animal becomes sacred only when it is designated as tithe, from which it is inferred: But not an animal that is already sacred for a different reason. Therefore, since an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain is already considered sacred due to the uncertainty, the sanctity of animal tithe would not apply to it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case of an uncertain redemption of a firstborn donkey, i.e., a lamb used as redemption for a donkey whose status as firstborn is uncertain. And this is in accordance with the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: An Israelite who has ten donkeys whose status as firstborn is uncertain in his home separates ten lambs to redeem them, and tithes the lambs, separating one as a tithe, and they all belong to him, as a priest cannot prove that he is entitled to any of the ten.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter of the bathhouse? Come and hear a conclusion, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said: There was a similar incident that was brought before the school of Rav Ḥisda, and Rav Ḥisda brought the case before the school of Rav Huna, and Rav Huna resolved the issue based on that which Rav Naḥman says: With regard to any property that one cannot recover from the possession of another party by legal process, if he consecrated it while it was in the possession of the other party the consecration is not valid.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara questions Rav Naḥman’s statement: By inference, is it so that if one can recover the property from the other party by legal process, and he consecrated it, the consecration is valid, although he has not yet recovered it? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: In a case where one robbed another of an item and the owner did not despair of retrieving it, neither the owner nor the robber can consecrate it; this one, the robber, because it is not his, and that one, the owner, because it is not in his possession? The indication is that one cannot consecrate even his own item if it is not in his possession.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: Did you think that in the case of the bathhouse we are dealing with a movable bath? No, we are dealing with a bath that is excavated in the ground, in which case once its owner can recover it by legal process there is no need to take possession of it, as it already exists in his possession.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § Rav Taḥalifa from the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, taught this baraita before Rabbi Abbahu: If two people are grasping a garment, this one takes up to where his hand reaches, and that one takes up to where his hand reaches, and they divide the remainder, the part of the garment that is in the grasp of neither, equally. Rabbi Abbahu indicated by means of a hand gesture that Rav Taḥalifa should add: And this is with the proviso that they take an oath.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: But then how can you find a case where the halakha in the mishna applies? As the mishna teaches that they divide the garment between them, and does not teach that this one takes up to where his hand reaches and that one does likewise. Rav Pappa said: The mishna is discussing a case where neither of them is grasping the garment itself, but rather they are holding onto the fringes [bekarkashta] of the garment. Therefore, each is required to take an oath and they divide the garment between them.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Mesharshiyya said: Learn a halakha with regard to the symbolic transfer of a cloth as a formal act of acquisition from Rav Pappa’s statement: The entire cloth need not change hands. Rather, once the recipient of the cloth has grasped three by three fingerbreadths of the cloth, which is the minimum size of a cloth that can be considered a utensil, the transaction takes effect, as we consider such an action to be an implementation of the verse upon which acquisition by means of a cloth is based: “Now this was the custom in former times in Israel…to confirm all things: A man drew off his shoe, and gave it to his neighbor; and this was the attestation in Israel” (Ruth 4:7).

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : This is because such an amount of the cloth is significant enough to be considered as though it were severed from the rest of the cloth, and therefore when the recipient grasps it, it effects the acquisition, even though the rest of the cloth is still in the hand of the other party.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: But in what way is this case different from the ruling of Rav Ḥisda? As Rav Ḥisda said: In a case where a husband placed a bill of divorce in his wife’s hand, and a string attached to the bill of divorce remained in his hand, if the husband can still pull the bill of divorce out of her hand and bring it to him, she is not divorced; and if he is not able to do so, e.g., if the string is too flimsy, then she is divorced. This indicates that as long as part of the bill of divorce remains in his hand, it is not considered as though he gave it to her.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a bill of divorce, we require that it accomplish a complete severance between the husband and wife, and as long as the husband continues to have some hold on the bill of divorce there is no complete severance. By contrast, here, in the case of a transaction by means of a cloth, we require an act of giving, and there is a valid act of giving even if only part of the cloth was given.