Guémara
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : and it was burned in the cauldron in which it was dyed, the dyer gives the owner the value of his wool. The Gemara infers: The value of his wool, yes, the dyer must pay that amount, but the value of the wool and its enhanced value, no, he need not pay. The Gemara suggests: Is this not referring to a case where the wool was burned after falling into the cauldron and the dye had taken hold, so that there is enhanced value, and one can learn from the mishna that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and therefore the dyer need not pay the enhanced value?
וְהִקְדִּיחוֹ יוֹרָה – נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ. דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ – אִין, דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְשִׁבְחוֹ – לָא; לָאו שֶׁהִקְדִּיחוֹ לְאַחַר נְפִילָה, דְּאִיכָּא שְׁבָחָא, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Shmuel said: This is not a proof. With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the wool was burned at the moment of falling into the cauldron, before the dye had taken hold, so that there is no enhancement. The Gemara asks: But according to this opinion, what would the halakha be if it was burned after falling into the cauldron, when the dye had taken hold? Would the dyer give the owner the value of his wool and its enhancement? Shall we say that Shmuel does not accept the statement of Rav Asi, and holds that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel?
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִקְדִּיחוֹ בִּשְׁעַת נְפִילָה, דְּלֵיכָּא שְׁבָחָא. אֲבָל הִקְדִּיחוֹ לְאַחַר נְפִילָה מַאי? נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְשִׁבְחוֹ?! לֵימָא שְׁמוּאֵל לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב אַסִּי?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara rejects this statement. Shmuel could have said to you: With what are we dealing here in the mishna? We are dealing with a case where the wool and herbs used in the dye both belong to the homeowner, and the dyer is taking only the payment of his hand, i.e., the wages for his labor, and nothing else. In this case, the craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, but in a case where the craftsman provides the materials, he does acquire such rights.
אָמַר לָךְ שְׁמוּאֵל: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן דְּצֶמֶר וְסַמָּנִין דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת, וְצַבָּע אֲגַר יְדֵיהּ הוּא דְּשָׁקֵיל.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if the homeowner’s herbs were also ruined by the dyer, the mishna should have said that the dyer gives the owner the value of his wool and herbs, not just the value of his wool. Rather, Shmuel is merely dismissing the Gemara’s proof with regard to the statement of Rav Asi that a craftsman acquires a vessel through its enhancement, by saying that the mishna could be understood otherwise. He does not, however, state his own opinion on this matter.
אִי הָכִי, ״נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְסַמָּנִין״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא שְׁמוּאֵל דַּחוֹיֵי קָא מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara offers another suggestion: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to one who gave his garment to a craftsman, and the craftsman concluded the work and notified the owner that the work was complete, even if the owner delays paying the craftsman from now until ten days henceforth, he does not violate, for this delay, the prohibition of: “You shall not oppress your neighbor, nor rob him; the wages of a hired worker shall not abide with you all night until the morning” (Leviticus 19:13). If the craftsman gave the garment to him at midday, then once the sun has set and the owner has not paid him, the owner does violate, for this delay, the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַנּוֹתֵן טַלִּיתוֹ לְאוּמָּן; גְּמָרוֹ וְהוֹדִיעוֹ – אֲפִילּוּ מִכָּאן וְעַד עֲשָׂרָה יָמִים אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם ״לֹא תָלִין״. נְתָנָהּ לוֹ בַּחֲצִי הַיּוֹם – כֵּיוָן שֶׁשָּׁקְעָה עָלָיו הַחַמָּה, עוֹבֵר עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תָּלִין״.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara concludes: And if it enters your mind to say that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, why does the owner violate the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages? It is as if the craftsman acquired the garment, and the payment is considered to be a purchase of the garment by the owner, rather than a wage.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי, אַמַּאי עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תָּלִין״?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara responds: Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: The baraita is stating the halakha with regard to the laundering of a thick garment, where there is no enhancement of the garment. Therefore, the craftsman does not acquire it.
אָמַר רַב מָרִי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא: בְּגִרְדָּא דְסַרְבָּלָא, דְּלֵיכָּא שְׁבָחָא.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: Ultimately, to what end did the owner of the garment give it to the craftsman? He gave it to him in order to soften it. Once he has softened it, that is its enhancement, and the craftsman has therefore acquired it. The Gemara responds: No; it is necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the owner hired the craftsman for treading, i.e., to forcefully tread on the garment in water until it softens, with the owner paying the craftsman a ma’a coin for each tread. The difference is that this is considered hired labor, where the craftsman is paid based on the amount of times he performed an action, and not contractual labor, where he is paid based on the outcome, in this case, a softened garment.
סוֹף סוֹף, לְמַאי יַהֲבַהּ נִהֲלֵיהּ – לְרַכּוֹכֵי; כֵּיוָן דְּרַכְּכֵיהּ, הַיְינוּ שְׁבָחָא! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאַגְרֵיהּ לְבִיטְשֵׁי – בִּיטְשָׁא בִּיטְשָׁא בְּמָעֲתָא, דְּהַיְינוּ שְׂכִירוּת.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara comments: And with regard to what entered our minds initially, that the owner did not hire the worker for treading but rather he hired him like a craftsman based on the assumption that the garment would be returned laundered, this supports the opinion of Rav Sheshet. As they asked Rav Sheshet: If one hires a contractor, who is not paid an hourly wage but is paid upon the completion of his task, and the one who hired him does not pay him on the day that he completes the work, does he violate, for this delay, the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages, or does he not violate the prohibition? And Rav Sheshet said to them: He does violate the prohibition.
וּלְמַאי דִּסְלֵיק אַדַּעְתִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּלָא אַגְרֵיהּ לְבִיטְשֵׁי, מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת – דִּבְעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: קַבְּלָנוּת, עוֹבֵר עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תָּלִין״, אוֹ אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר? וַאֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: עוֹבֵר.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: Shall we say based on this statement that Rav Sheshet disagrees with the statement of Rav Asi, who holds that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and his payment is not considered to be a wage? Shmuel bar Aḥa said: Rav Sheshet is discussing a specific type of contractor, and he stated his ruling with regard to an agent tasked with the delivery of a letter, in which case, since the contractor’s only task is to deliver the letter, there is no enhancement through which he might acquire ownership rights. Consequently the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages applies.
לֵימָא דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת פְּלִיגָא אַדְּרַב אַסִּי? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַחָא: בִּשְׁלִיחָא דְאִיגַּרְתָּא.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement of Rav Asi, that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: If a woman gave gold to a goldsmith, instructing him: Fashion bracelets, earrings, or rings for me, and I will be betrothed to you as payment for your work, then once he has fashioned them she is betrothed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She is not betrothed until money enters her possession.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי? ״עֲשֵׂה לִי שֵׁירִים, נְזָמִין וְטַבָּעוֹת, וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ לָךְ״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁעֲשָׂאָן – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ מָמוֹן לְיָדָהּ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: What is this money mentioned by the Rabbis? If we say it means that very money, i.e., the rings she ordered, then by inference Rabbi Meir holds that even that very money is not required in order for the betrothal to take effect. But with what does he betroth her? He has given her nothing but the jewelry. Rather, it is obvious. To what money are the Rabbis referring? They must be referring to when he betroths her via other money, i.e., the payment she owes him for his service. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, in order for the betrothal to take effect he must give her additional money, while according to Rabbi Meir the betrothal takes effect when he gives her the jewelry.
מַאי ״מָמוֹן״? אִילֵּימָא אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן, מִכְּלָל דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן לָא?! אֶלָּא בְּמַאי [כּוּ] מִקַּדְּשָׁא? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא, מַאי ״מָמוֹן״ – מָמוֹן אַחֵר;