Traité Bava Kamma

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rava continues the report in their name: Apparently, we require the evaluation of the court in order to render him liable to pay for the damage. And with regard to this ox that killed, once the verdict was given that it to be put to death, we do not delay the implementation of the verdict in order to wait for the evaluation of the court, and we do not delay its judgment. Therefore, the monetary case is not judged.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And I, Rava, said to the Sages of the school of Rav: Even if you say that this halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who does not require assessment by the court, one could explain that here we are dealing with a case where the owner of the ox fled, and the court cannot judge his case in his absence and cannot render him liable to pay for the damage caused by his ox.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: If the baraita is discussing a case where the owner fled, then in the case where they did not yet judge it as a case of capital law, how does the court judge it as a case of monetary law without the owner of the ox being present? The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the court accepted the testimony of the witnesses in the presence of the owner, and he subsequently fled.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: Ultimately, from where are the damages paid in a situation where the owner fled, as he is not here to pay the damages? The Gemara answers: They are paid from plowing. The ox is rented out to plow fields, and the fees generated are used to pay the damages. Afterward, the ox is judged for the killing as a case of capital law. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to an innocuous ox, why did the baraita rule that the court does not judge it as a case of monetary law? The court should judge it as a case of monetary law first, and the damages will be paid from fees generated from renting out the animal for plowing, and then the court should judge it as a case of capital law.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said in answer to this last question: That is to say that the money gained from plowing is considered like the superior-quality property of its owner. In other words, that money is like the rest of the owner’s estate, and is not considered to be part of the value of the ox itself. Since payment for damage caused by an innocuous ox is taken only from the value of the ox itself, it follows that money received from renting out the ox to plow cannot be used to pay damages.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § In connection with the ruling of the baraita that the court must assess whether the death can be attributed directly to the action of the assailant, the Gemara notes: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is there an evaluation performed with regard to damage as well, to determine whether the act was sufficient to inflict that damage, or is there no evaluation performed with regard to damage?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Do we say that specifically in a case of killing is where we perform an evaluation? The assessment is to determine whether a soul departs with this assault and the assailant will be held liable or whether a soul doesn’t depart with this assault and the death is attributed to other factors. But in a case of damage, perhaps we say that he is liable for whatever caused the damage. Or perhaps there is no difference between the two, and with regard to damage as well, the court evaluates whether the act was sufficient to inflict that damage, and if it was not, he will be exempt.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara says: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a mishna (50b) concerning the halakhot of a pit: Just as a pit that has sufficient depth to cause death when falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that have sufficient depth to cause death may be no less than ten handbreadths. If any of the types of excavations were less than ten handbreadths deep, and an ox or a donkey fell into one of them and died, the digger of the excavation is exempt. But if it was injured in it but did not die he is liable to pay damages.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : What, is it not the case that the mishna is counting the handbreadths from below to above, and this is what it is saying: From one handbreadth deep until ten handbreadths deep, there is no liability for death but there is liability for damage? Apparently, with regard to damage he is liable for whatever caused the damage, even a fall into an excavation having the depth of one handbreadth. Learn from the mishna that the court does not perform an evaluation with regard to damage.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is counting from above to below, and this is what it is saying: If the excavation is ten handbreadths deep then there is liability for death. If the excavation is slightly less than ten, there is liability for damage but there is no liability for death. And actually, I will say to you that there is an evaluation performed for damage, and for each and every circumstance, we require that there be conditions whereby the injured party could reasonably be damaged by whatever caused the damage.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:26): If a slave owner struck his Canaanite slave on his eye and blinded him, or on his ear and deafened him, the slave is emancipated by means of these wounds. If he struck near his eye and as a result he does not see, or near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these wounds. What is the reason that the slave is not emancipated? Isn’t it due to the fact that we require an evaluation of the damage, and in such a case the assumption is that the owner’s action did not suffice to cause the injury? And learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara rejects this: No; the slave is not emancipated, because we say that it is possible that it was the slave who frightened himself, resulting in his blindness or deafness, but it was not the actual strike that caused it. An injury can result from being frightened, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 6:16): One who frightens another and thereby causes him injury is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. How so? If one shouted into another’s ear and deafened him, he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. But if he held him and shouted into his ear and deafened him, he is liable according to human laws as well, as he physically took hold of him.