Traité Bava Kamma

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : by which he lowered her monetary value, diminishing the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal. But with regard to a wound, by which he did not lower her monetary value, Rabbi Elazar did not even raise a dilemma.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: Rabbi Yoḥanan is discussing a case where someone wounded her on her face, and he thereby lowered her monetary value, as this affects the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The mishna teaches: One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so one who injures a slave pays only the other four types of indemnity. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: The verse states with regard to the indemnity of humiliation: “When men strive together, a man and his brother” (Deuteronomy 25:11). The formulation “and his brother” teaches that the payment of compensation for humiliation is applicable with regard to someone who has a relationship of brotherhood with a Jew. This is excluding a Canaanite slave, who does not have a relationship of brotherhood with Jews. And the Sages, who hold that a Canaanite slave is included in the halakhot of compensation for humiliation, maintain that he is the Jews’ brother with regard to the observance of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to observe most mitzvot.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara challenges: If that is so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaves are not in the category of brothers, conspiring witnesses who testify that a Canaanite slave committed a sin punishable by capital punishment should not be put to death by the court, as it is written: “You shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), and the slave is not considered a brother. Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The same verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And you shall put away the evil from your midst,” indicating that the punishment for conspiring witnesses should be applied in any case, including when they testified about a slave.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara raises another challenge: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit for kingship, as it is written: “One from among your brothers shall you set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15). The Sages say in response: But according to your reasoning, the halakha disqualifying a convert from being king should pose a difficulty for you according to all opinions, both according to the opinion of the Sages and of Rabbi Yehuda: Why is a convert not fit to be a king, as he is certainly in the category of brother? The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “One from among your brothers shall you set a king over you,” which indicates that the king must be from the choicest among your brothers, which disqualifies both converts and slaves.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara challenges further: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit to bear witness, as it is written: “And behold, the witness is a false witness, and has testified falsely against his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:18). If a slave is considered a brother, why is he not eligible to testify in court?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Ulla said: You cannot say that a slave is fit to bear witness, because the halakha concerning the testimony of a slave is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha concerning the testimony of a woman: And just as a woman, who is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of fit lineage, is nevertheless disqualified from bearing witness, so too, with regard to a slave, who is not fit to enter the congregation, is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara counters this derivation: What is notable about a woman? She is notable in that she is not fit to undergo the mitzva of circumcision. Would you say that from the fact that a woman is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is fit to undergo circumcision? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a minor shall prove that one’s fitness to undergo circumcision is not germane to one’s qualification to bear witness, as a minor is included in the mitzva to undergo circumcision, and yet he is disqualified from bearing witness.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : This is countered: What is notable about a minor? He is notable in that he is not obligated in the performance of mitzvot. Would you say that from the fact that a minor is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is obligated in the performance of mitzvot? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a woman shall prove the matter, as she is obligated in the performance of mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique halakha. Their common denominator is that both a woman and a minor are not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. I will also bring the case of the slave for inclusion in this halakha, as he is also not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : This derivation is rejected: What is notable about their common denominator? It is notable in that a woman or a minor is not a man, and this is why they are disqualified from bearing witness. Would you say that from the fact that they are disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is a man?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara offers a different derivation: Rather, derive the halakha that a slave is disqualified from bearing witness from that of a robber, who is disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara objects: What is notable about a robber? He is notable in that his actions caused him to be disqualified. Would you say that from the fact that a robber is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, whose actions did not cause him to be unfit?