Traité Bava Kamma

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and ben Azzai disagree over whether the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail is applied with regard to a generalization and a detail that are distant from each other. When a generalization is followed by a detail, the halakha applies only in the case specified in the detail. The verse states: “Keviyya for keviyya, a wound for a wound, ḥabura for ḥabura” (Exodus 21:25). The word “keviyya,” as stated in the beginning of the verse, is a generalization that includes burns not accompanied by bruises as well as burns accompanied by bruises. “Ḥabura,” as stated at the end of the verse, is a detail of a burn that is accompanied by a bruise. The Torah distances the detail, “ḥabura,” from the generalization, “keviyya,” by stating the halakha of: “A wound for a wound” between them.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that since there is an intervening phrase between the generalization and the detail, one does not derive the halakha from the verse concerning burns and bruises by employing the principle of a generalization and a detail. Therefore, the one who caused the injury is liable to pay compensation for pain in all cases of burns, even those that are not accompanied by bruises. And ben Azzai holds that one does derive the halakha from the verse concerning burns and bruises by employing the principle of a generalization and a detail, and therefore the one who caused the injury is liable to pay compensation for pain only if the burn is accompanied by a bruise. And if you would say: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, why do I need the Torah to state the halakha of “ḥabura for ḥabura,” as that is included as a subset of “keviyya”? The phrase mentioning “ḥabura” is necessary to teach the halakha of additional money, i.e., in a case where someone caused a burn with a bruise, he pays additional compensation for the bruise beyond that for the burn.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The mishna teaches: How is the payment for pain assessed? The court evaluates how much money a person with a similar threshold for pain as the victim is willing to take in order to be made to suffer in this way. The one who burned the victim must then pay this amount. The Gemara asks: How do we appraise pain in a case where the injured party also suffered personal injury?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Shmuel’s father says: The court evaluates how much money a person is willing to take to allow someone to sever his hand. The Gemara objects: Do you really mean to sever his hand? Wouldn’t this evaluation be not just for pain, but to include all five types of indemnity? Moreover, are we dealing with fools, who would accept money to have their hands severed? The Gemara answers: Rather, the court evaluates how much money a person would accept to allow someone to sever his already severed hand, which is of no use. The Gemara objects: In the case of his severed hand also, there is not pain alone, but there is both pain and humiliation, because it is an embarrassing matter for him if someone were to take a part of his flesh to throw it to dogs.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: Rather, the court evaluates how much a person is willing to take to allow someone to sever his hand, which is already condemned by a written decree from the government to be severed, changing the decree from having it severed by means of a drug, which is not accompanied by pain, to having it severed by means of a sword, which is accompanied by pain. The amount of money he would accept to have his hand severed by a sword instead of by the drug is his compensation. The Sages say in objection: Here too, one would not take money and cause himself pain in this way, so there is no indemnity to evaluate.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: Rather, the court evaluates how much a person would give to have someone sever his hand, which is already condemned by a written decree from the government to be severed, changing the decree from having it be severed by means of a sword, which is accompanied by pain, to having it be severed by means of a drug, which is not accompanied by pain.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara objects: If this is the case, then this wording of the mishna: To take, is imprecise; it should have said: To give. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The mishna means that the court evaluates how much this one, the injured party, will take from that one, i.e., the one who caused the injury, based on what this man, the injured party, would have given to the government to have his hand severed by a drug rather than with a sword.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The mishna teaches: How is payment for medical costs assessed? If one struck another, then he is liable to heal him by paying for his medical costs. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:4): If growths appeared on the injured area due to the injury, and the wound reopened, then the one who caused the injury is again liable to heal him by covering his medical costs, and is liable to give him the value of his loss of livelihood while he recovers from the reopened wound. But if the growths that appeared are not due to the injury, he is not liable to heal him by covering his medical costs, and he is not liable to give him the value of his loss of livelihood.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says that even if the growths appeared due to the injury, he is liable to heal him by covering his medical costs, but he is not liable to give him the value of his loss of livelihood. And the Rabbis say: The one who caused the injury is not liable at all, because the Torah states the halakhot of compensation for his loss of livelihood and his medical costs together. This teaches that anyone who is liable to pay compensation for loss of livelihood is also liable to pay compensation for medical costs, and anyone who is not liable to pay compensation for loss of livelihood is also not liable to pay compensation for medical costs.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabba said: I found the Sages in the study hall of Rav when they were sitting and were stating an explanation: Here, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree about whether a wound may be wrapped in a bandage, i.e., whether one is permitted to bandage his wound to lessen the pain, at the risk of causing damaging side effects.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabba explains: The Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna in the baraita, hold that a wound may be wrapped in a bandage. Consequently, if the bandage causes side effects which lead the injured party to incur additional medical expenses, those expenses are considered to have resulted from the original injury. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that a wound may not be wrapped in a bandage. Therefore, with regard to medical costs, about which the verse repeated the obligation to pay them, by stating: “And shall cause him to be thoroughly healed [verappo yerappe]” (Exodus 21:19), the one who caused the injury is liable to pay compensation. But for loss of livelihood, about which the verse did not repeat the obligation to pay it, the one who caused the injury is not liable to pay compensation.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabba continues: And I said to them that if Rabbi Yehuda were to hold that a wound may not be wrapped in a bandage, then the one who caused the injury should also not be liable to pay compensation for medical costs, as he is not liable to compensate the injured party for damage resulting from his own irresponsible behavior. Rather, the disagreement is as follows: Everyone agrees that a wound may be wrapped in a bandage, but may not be wrapped in an excessive bandage.