Guémara
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : in the case of a small person who killed a large person, or a large person who killed a small person, how do we kill the murderer? If one suggests that in such a case a monetary penalty will be imposed, the Torah stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), teaching that the law shall be equal for all of you, so the punishment must be the same for all murderers. Rather, explain that since the murderer took the life of the victim, the Merciful One states that the court should likewise take the life from him. So too, since the one who caused the injury took the sight from the eye of the injured party, the Merciful One states that the court should likewise take the sight from his eye. Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda, in accordance with the objection of the Sages.
קָטָן שֶׁהָרַג אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְגָדוֹל שֶׁהָרַג אֶת הַקָּטָן, הֵיכִי קָטְלִינַן לֵיהּ? הַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״ – מִשְׁפָּט הַשָּׁוֶה לְכוּלְּכֶם! אֶלָּא נְשָׁמָה שְׁקַיל מִינֵּיהּ, נְשָׁמָה אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא נִשְׁקוֹל מִינֵּיהּ; הָכִי נָמֵי, נְהוֹרָא שְׁקַיל מִינֵּיהּ, נְהוֹרָא אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא נִשְׁקוֹל מִינֵּיהּ!
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara presents another derivation: It is taught in another baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: “An eye for an eye” (Leviticus 24:20), is referring to monetary restitution. Do you say that this is referring to monetary restitution, or is it only teaching that the one who caused the injury must lose an actual eye? There may be a case where there was a blind person and he blinded another, or there was one with a severed limb and he severed the limb of another, or there was a lame person and he caused another to be lame. In this case, how can I fulfill “an eye for an eye” literally, when he is already lacking the limb that must be injured? If one will suggest that in that case, a monetary penalty will be imposed, that can be refuted: But the Torah stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), which teaches that the law shall be equal for all of you.
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי אוֹמֵר: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״ – מָמוֹן. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר מָמוֹן, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא עַיִן מַמָּשׁ? הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה סוֹמֵא, וְסִימֵּא; קִיטֵּעַ, וְקִיטַּע; חִיגֵּר, וְחִיגֵּר; הֵיאַךְ אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים בָּזֶה ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״ – וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״, מִשְׁפָּט הַשָּׁוֶה לְכוּלְּכֶם?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Sages object to this derivation and say: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps in a case where it is possible to render the guilty party liable according to the punishment listed in the Torah, it is possible and the court does so; but in a case where it is not possible to enact such a punishment, it is not possible, and we exempt him. As if you do not say so, that punishing one and exempting another is not counter to the principle of: “One manner of law,” then by the same logic, in the case of one who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa] and who killed a healthy person, what do we do to him?
אָמְרִי: וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר; הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר, וּפָטְרִינַן לֵיהּ! דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, טְרֵפָה שֶׁהָרַג אֶת הַשָּׁלֵם – מַאי עָבְדִינַן לֵיהּ?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, one must say that in a case where it is possible to render the guilty party liable according to the punishment listed in the Torah, it is possible and the court does so; but in a case where it is not possible to do so, it is not possible, and we exempt him. Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, in accordance with the objection of the Sages.
אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר; הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר, וּפָטְרִינַן לֵיהּ!
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara presents another derivation: The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: “A fracture for a fracture, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; as he has given a blemish to a person, so shall it be given unto him” (Leviticus 24:20), and giving can refer only to a payment of money. The Gemara challenges: But if that is so, then when the same verse states: “As he has given [yitten] a blemish to a person,” does this word, “yitten,” also refer to money? The word “yitten” means that he caused an actual injury, even though it employs a term whose literal meaning is give.
דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ״ – וְאֵין נְתִינָה אֶלָּא מָמוֹן. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מוּם בָּאָדָם״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמָמוֹן הוּא?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Sages say in response: The rabbis of the school of Rabbi Yishmael are interpreting a superfluous verse. Now, it is written: “And if a man gives a blemish to his neighbor; as he has done, so shall it be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19), so why do I need the verse: “So shall it be given unto him” (Leviticus 24:20)? Learn from the repetition that the verse is referring to monetary restitution. The Gemara asks: But if this is so, why do I need the verse: “As he has given [yitten] a blemish to a person” (Leviticus 24:20)? What does the usage of the term “yitten” teach? The Gemara answers: In fact, it does not teach anything, but rather, since the Merciful One needs to write at the end of that verse: “So shall it be given unto him,” where the employment of a term of giving is accurate, the Merciful One also wrote earlier in the verse: “As he has given [yitten] a blemish to a person.”
אָמְרִי: דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – קְרָא יַתִּירָא דָּרְשִׁי; מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״וְאִישׁ כִּי יִתֵּן מוּם בַּעֲמִיתוֹ, כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כֵּן יֵעָשֶׂה לוֹ״; ״כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מָמוֹן. ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מוּם בָּאָדָם״ – לְמָה לִי? אַיְּידֵי דְּבָעֵי מִיכְתַּב ״כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ״, כְּתַב נָמֵי ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מוּם בָּאָדָם״.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara presents another derivation: The school of Rabbi Ḥiyya taught that the verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And your eye shall not pity; a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21). This teaches that the witnesses pay compensation with that which is given from hand to hand. And what type of compensation is that? Monetary restitution. The Gemara challenges: But if that is so, is the phrase: “A foot for a foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21), also like that, i.e., is it teaching that the witnesses pay compensation with an item passed from foot to foot?
דְּבֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא תָּנָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״יָד בְּיָד״ – דָּבָר הַנִּיתָּן מִיָּד לְיָד; וּמַאי נִיהוּ? מָמוֹן. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״רֶגֶל בְּרָגֶל״ נָמֵי הָכִי הוּא?!
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Sages say: The rabbis of the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya are interpreting a superfluous phrase in the verse. Now, it is written: “And you shall do to him as he purposed to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). If it enters your mind to say that the verse means this literally, why do I need the Torah to specify: “A hand for a hand” (Deuteronomy 19:21)? The punishment will be whatever he purported to do to his brother. Learn from the extra phrase that the punishment is monetary restitution. If so, why do I need the phrase: “A foot for a foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21)? Since it is written: “A hand for a hand,” the Merciful One also wrote in the Torah: “A foot for a foot.”
אָמְרִי: דְּבֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא – קְרָא יַתִּירָא קָא דָרְשִׁי; מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו״; אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מַמָּשׁ, ״יָד בְּיָד״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מָמוֹן. ״רֶגֶל בְּרָגֶל״ לְמָה לִי? אַיְּידֵי דִּכְתִיב ״יָד בְּיָד״, כְּתַב נָמֵי ״רֶגֶל בְּרָגֶל״.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara presents another derivation: Abaye says that this principle is derived from that which was taught by the school of Ḥizkiyya, as the school of Ḥizkiyya taught that the Torah states: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), and: “A life for a life” (Exodus 21:23), but not an eye and a life for an eye. And if it enters your mind to say that the verse means this literally, there could be times when you find a case where both an eye and a life are taken for an eye, i.e., when the one who caused the damage is so weak that as the court blinds his eye, his soul departs from his body.
אַבָּיֵי אוֹמֵר: אָתְיָא מִדְּתָנֵי דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה, דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״; ״נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ״ – וְלֹא נֶפֶשׁ וְעַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מַמָּשׁ, זִימְנִין דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ עַיִן וָנֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת עַיִן – דְּבַהֲדֵי דְּעַוַּיר לֵיהּ, נְפַקָא לֵיהּ נִשְׁמְתֵיהּ.
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara objects: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps we evaluate the physical condition of the guilty party; if he can withstand this punishment, then we do blind his eye; if he cannot withstand this punishment, then we do not do so and he goes unpunished. And if we evaluate him and determine that he can withstand this punishment, and we do so to him and blind his eye, and yet his soul departs his body as a result, if he dies, he will die. Didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to lashes (Makkot 22b): If one was sentenced to be flogged, and the court evaluated him and determined that he could withstand a certain number of lashes, and he dies at the hand of the officer tasked with administering the lashes, then the officer is exempt, even though the one who was flogged was not sentenced to the death penalty? Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Abaye.
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא מֵימָד אָמְדִינַן לֵיהּ; אִי מָצֵי מְקַבֵּל – עָבְדִינַן, וְאִי לָא מָצֵי מְקַבֵּל – לָא עָבְדִינַן; וְאִי אָמְדִינַן דְּמָצֵי מְקַבֵּל, וְעָבְדִינַן בֵּיהּ וּנְפַק רוּחֵיהּ – אִי מָיֵית, לֵימוּת! מִי לָא תְּנַן גַּבֵּי מַלְקוֹת: אֲמָדוּהוּ, וּמֵת תַּחַת יָדוֹ – פָּטוּר?
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara presents another derivation: Rav Zevid said in the name of Rabba that the verse states: “A wound for a wound” (Exodus 21:25), to teach that one who injures another must pay compensation for pain, even in a case where he pays compensation for damage. And if it enters your mind that the phrase: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), refers to the removal of an actual eye from the one who injured the other, then just as it is so that the injured party has pain from the loss of his eye, the one who caused him injury also has pain when the court removes his eye; why then does the Torah require that he pay compensation for pain as well?
רַב זְבִיד מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״פֶּצַע תַּחַת פָּצַע״ – לִיתֵּן צַעַר בִּמְקוֹם נֶזֶק. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ מַמָּשׁ – כִּי הֵיכִי דִּלְהַאי הָוֵי לֵיהּ צַעֲרָא, לְהַאי נָמֵי אִית לֵיהּ צַעֲרָא!
Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara objects: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps there is a person who is delicate, so he has more pain, and there is a person who is not delicate, so he does not have the same amount of pain. Therefore, even if the court actually removes an eye for an eye, the one who caused the injury might still need to compensate the injured party for pain. What is the practical difference when the Torah states: “A wound for a wound” (Exodus 21:25)? It renders the one who caused the injury liable to give the injured party compensation for the difference between them in pain tolerance. Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Rav Zevid.
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא אִיכָּא אִינִישׁ דִּמְפַנַּק – אִית לֵיהּ צַעֲרָא טְפֵי, וְאִיכָּא אִינִישׁ דְּלָא מְפַנַּק – לֵית לֵיהּ צַעֲרָא! לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִתַּבי לֵיהּ הַיְאךְ דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי.