Traité Bava Kamma

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, is it not correct to say that by citing the more complicated case, this is what the mishna teaches us: It is only in this case, where it is established that the thief stole an animal based on the testimony of two witnesses, and it is established that he slaughtered or sold it based on the testimony of one witness or based on his own admission, and where he does not obligate himself through his admission to pay the principal, that he is obligated to pay the fine.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara elaborates: In other words, it is only in that case, where the theft is established based on the testimony of two witnesses, that we say that liability based on his own admission is similar to the testimony of one witness, in that just as when the slaughter is established based on the testimony of one witness, if one other witness later comes he joins together with the first witness and together their testimony is rendered a valid testimony of two witnesses and the thief becomes liable to pay, so too, in a case when the slaughter is established based on his own admission, if witnesses subsequently come and testify, he becomes liable to pay the fine, as his admission would not have rendered him liable to pay any payment.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : But if it is established that the thief stole an animal and slaughtered or sold it, all based on the testimony of one witness or based on his own admission, in which case through his admission he obligates himself to pay the principal amount, we do not say that when witnesses testify subsequent to his own admission it is similar to when they arrive subsequent to the testimony of one witness, and he is liable to pay the fine in both cases. Rather, since in this case his admission would have rendered him liable to pay the principal due to the fact that the theft was not established based on the testimony of two witnesses, it is considered a proper admission, which exempts him from paying the fine.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The baraita that supports Rav Hamnuna’s opinion is the one cited earlier, as it is taught: If a thief saw witnesses who were approaching with the intent to testify against him, and at that point he said: I admit that I stole an animal, but I did not slaughter or sell it, he pays only the principal. Why do I need the baraita to teach: And the thief said: I admit that I stole an animal but I did not slaughter or sell it? Let it teach a simpler case, in which the thief said either: I stole the animal, or: I slaughtered it, or: I sold it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, by choosing the more complicated case, this is what the baraita teaches us: The only reason that the thief is exempt from payment is that he says: I stole the animal, as in that case he obligated himself to pay the principal. But if he says: I did not steal, and witnesses came and testified that he did steal an animal, and subsequently he changed his claim and says: I slaughtered it, or: I sold it, and then witnesses came and confirmed that he slaughtered or sold it, in which case the thief did not obligate himself to pay the principal or any other payment, he would be liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Apparently, an admission to the slaughter of a stolen animal is not considered a valid admission, as such an admission does not obligate the perpetrator to pay a fine.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara says, in rejection of this second proof: No, it is possible to explain the reason the tanna of the baraita chose to present this case in a different manner, as it teaches us this halakha itself: That once the thief says: I stole the animal, even if he also says: I did not slaughter or sell it, and later witnesses came and testified that he slaughtered or sold it, he is exempt from paying the fourfold or fivefold payment. What is the reason for this exemption?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The reason is that the Merciful One states in the Torah that there is a payment of four sheep for a sheep and five oxen for an ox (see Exodus 21:37). This indicates that a thief can be rendered liable to pay, respectively, a fourfold or fivefold payment, but not a fourfold payment for an ox, nor a threefold payment for a sheep. In other words, one should not view the fines as independent of each other, that if the thief is found with the animal he pays as a fine the double payment, and if he slaughtered or sold it he pays a different fine, i.e., the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rather, the fourfold or fivefold payment comprises the principal, the double payment, and an additional two or three times the principal. By admitting to his act of theft, the thief exempts himself from the double payment, and the remaining fine for slaughtering a sheep would be a threefold payment, or a fourfold payment for an ox, which are not mandated by the Torah.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara proposes: Let us say that the opinion of Rav Hamnuna and Rabbi Yoḥanan is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: If two witnesses testify that someone stole an animal, and two others testify against him that he slaughtered or sold the animal, and the witnesses who had testified concerning the theft were rendered conspiring witnesses, the thief is exempt from all payment, as testimony that was partially invalidated is entirely invalidated. If the testimony concerning the theft was undermined, the testimony concerning the slaughter or sale is thereby rendered irrelevant. Consequently, the alleged thief is exempt from any payment.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : If the witnesses who testified concerning the slaughter or sale were rendered conspiring witnesses, but the testimony concerning the theft remains credible, the thief pays the double payment, and the conspiring witnesses pay a threefold payment, as that is the loss they sought to impose on the thief. The Sages said in the name of Sumakhos: The witnesses pay the double payment, and the thief pays a threefold payment for an ox and a twofold payment for a ram. This concludes the baraita.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara analyzes the statement of Sumakhos: To which clause in the baraita is Sumakhos referring? If we say that he is referring to the first clause, in which the testimony concerning the theft is invalidated, this is impossible. Doesn’t Sumakhos accept the principle that testimony that was partially invalidated is entirely invalidated, in this case rendering the testimony concerning the slaughter or sale irrelevant if there is no testimony concerning the theft?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : But rather, he must be referring to the latter clause of the baraita, in which the testimony concerning the slaughter or sale is invalidated. This, too, is impossible, as in this case the Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna of the baraita, say well, i.e., what they state is reasonable, and the thief pays the double payment and the witnesses pay a threefold payment. On what basis would Sumakhos dispute this ruling?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, it must be that Sumakhos is referring to a different case entirely, one that is not mentioned explicitly in the baraita, and a different matter is at the core of the dispute between them. Sumakhos is referring to a case where two people come and say to the thief: You stole an animal. The thief said to them in reply: Yes, I did steal the animal, and moreover, I slaughtered it, or: I sold it. But I did not steal it in your presence, and your testimony that you saw me steal it is false. And subsequently the thief brought new witnesses who rendered the original witnesses conspiring witnesses, by testifying that they were in a different place at the time they claimed that the theft occurred, thereby proving that the thief did not steal in their presence. And finally, the owner of the animal brought other witnesses who testified that the thief stole the animal and slaughtered or sold it.