Traité Bava Kamma

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : the slave should go free on account of his eye, and if he knocked out his tooth he should go free on account of his tooth, and if the master both blinded his eye and knocked out his tooth, the slave should go free on account of both his eye and his tooth, without the master having to pay damages for the loss of his tooth.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Abaye said to him in response: With regard to your claim, the verse states: “And if a man smites the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall let him go free for his eye’s sake” (Exodus 21:26). The phrase “for his eye’s sake” indicates: But not for the sake of both his eye and his tooth. The same can be inferred from the subsequent verse: “And if he smites out his bondman’s tooth or his bondwoman’s tooth, he shall let him go free for his tooth’s sake” (Exodus 21:27). The phrase “for his tooth’s sake” indicates: But not for the sake of both his eye and his tooth.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara returns to Rava’s opinion that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony. Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too can learn from the mishna that Rava’s claim is correct, as it teaches (72b): If one stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered the animal or sold it, also based on the testimony of the same witnesses, and these witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses, these conspiring witnesses must pay everything, i.e., not only the principal amount but also the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : What, is it not referring to a case where they testified concerning the theft and then testified concerning the slaughter, and they were subsequently rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the theft and then were rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the slaughter?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Idi bar Avin states his inference: But once they were rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the theft, their testimony with regard to the slaughter is in effect contradicted, i.e., nullified, as testimony concerning the slaughter of an animal without prior testimony establishing that the animal was stolen is meaningless. And yet the mishna teaches that the witnesses must pay everything. And if it enters your mind that the contradiction of testimony is not the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony, why should they pay a fine for lying about the slaughter? Their testimony concerning the slaughter was rendered irrelevant before it was established as conspiring testimony. Rather, must one not conclude from this mishna that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Sages say in refutation of this inference: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the witnesses were rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the slaughter first, before they were rendered conspiring witnesses in their testimony concerning the theft itself. In this case, the testimony concerning the slaughter was not rendered irrelevant before it was rendered conspiring testimony.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And this is a matter in the dispute between other amora’im, before Rava and Abaye discussed it. As it was stated: With regard to witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted by two other witnesses and ultimately were rendered conspiring witnesses, this is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar. One said: These witnesses are killed, like all conspiring witnesses in a capital case, as the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony, and one said: They are not killed.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara suggests: It may be concluded that it is Rabbi Elazar who says they are not killed. As Rabbi Elazar says: Witnesses who were contradicted in a case involving the taking of a life, i.e., a capital case, are flogged for violating the prohibition: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13).

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And if it enters your mind that it is Rabbi Elazar who says that witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted and ultimately found to be conspiring witnesses are killed, why are they flogged in this case? There is always the possibility that they might be rendered conspiring witnesses, which would render them liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment. Consequently, this is a case of a prohibition given as warning of liability for court-imposed capital punishment, and there is a principle that one is not flogged for violating any prohibition given as warning of liability for court-imposed capital punishment.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this statement that it is Rabbi Elazar who says that witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted and ultimately were found to be conspiring witnesses are not killed? The Gemara affirms: It may be concluded that this is so.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks a question with regard to Rabbi Elazar’s opinion that witnesses who were contradicted in a capital case are flogged. Why are they flogged simply because their testimony was contradicted? They are two witnesses, and they are contradicted by two other witnesses. What did you see in the testimony of the second set of witnesses that leads you to rely on those witnesses to the extent that the first set of witnesses is flogged? You could just as well rely on these witnesses, i.e., the first witnesses. How can the court ever determine with certainty that a given testimony is false based merely on contradictory testimony?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Abaye said: The contradiction to which Rabbi Elazar is referring involves a case where the witnesses testified that they saw a certain person murdered, and subsequently the individual who was allegedly killed came to the court on his feet, conclusively disproving their testimony.