Traité Bava Kamma

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : In the case of one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans [Kutim], if there is reason to suspect that teruma and tithes were not separated, and he cannot separate them before the start of Shabbat, he acts as follows. If there are one hundred log of wine in the barrels, he says: Two log that I will separate in the future are teruma, as the mandated average measure of teruma is one-fiftieth; ten log are first tithe; and a tenth of the remainder, nine log, are second tithe. And he desacralizes the second tithe that he will separate in the future by transferring its sanctity onto money, and he may drink the wine immediately, relying on the separation that he will perform later. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon prohibit one from doing so. The objection of these three Sages is presumably that this arrangement relies on the principle of retroactive designation, as at the time of the declaration the identity of the particular portions of wine that will be teruma and tithes is unknown, and these Sages do not accept this principle. It is apparent from this mishna that Rabbi Yehuda does not accept retroactive designation, and therefore he cannot be the one who said that the owner of the field may issue his declaration of relinquishment in the morning.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara says: Ultimately, why do you reverse the baraita that contains the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Dosa? It is because there is a difficulty due to the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Now too, although you have reversed the baraita, a similar problem remains, as there is a difficulty due to the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : As you said, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Do not say that anything that was picked from this vine by passersby shall be desacralized onto these coins. Rather, say that anything that will be picked from this vine shall be desacralized onto these coins. Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan here accepts the principle of retroactive designation. But it is established that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not accept the principle of retroactive designation.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : As Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Brothers who divided property received as an inheritance are considered purchasers from each other, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee Year, at which point they may redistribute the property. This demonstrates that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not hold that it is retroactively clarified that each brother’s portion was designated for him directly upon their father’s death, but rather all the land was considered joint property until the brothers traded or bought their respective portions from each other at the time of the distribution of the estate.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : In light of this objection, the Gemara retracts its previous assertion that Rabbi Yoḥanan reformulated the declaration of the pious ones. Rather, the pious ones actually declared in the past tense: Anything that was picked from this vine by passersby shall be desacralized onto these coins, i.e., the desacralizing took place after the grapes were stolen. If so, the question remains: Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan not accept the opinion of the pious ones, but instead ruled that the owner of an item cannot consecrate it after it has been stolen?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan found a different unattributed mishna, which contradicts the opinion of the pious ones. As we learned in the mishna here (62b): One who steals an item after a thief has already stolen it, i.e., one who steals a stolen item, does not pay the double payment to the thief or to the prior owner. Why not? Granted that he does not pay to the first thief, as the verse states: “And it was stolen from the house of the man; if the thief shall be found he shall pay double” (Exodus 22:6), which indicates that the double payment applies in the case of an item “stolen from the house of the man,” i.e., from the owner’s jurisdiction, but not to an item stolen from the thief’s house. But let him pay the double payment to the owner, as it presumably still belonged to the owner when the second thief stole it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, must one not conclude from this that a stolen item is not under the full jurisdiction of either the owner or the thief? It is not under the jurisdiction of this one, the first thief, because it does not belong to him, and it is not under the jurisdiction of that one, the owner, because it is not in his possession. Therefore, neither of them can consecrate the stolen item.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: Granted that this unattributed mishna disagrees with the mishna that cites the pious ones, but what did you see that led you to follow that unattributed mishna, the one that discusses the double payment? Let Rabbi Yoḥanan act, i.e., rule, in accordance with this unattributed mishna, which states the practice of the pious ones. On what basis did he choose one mishna over the other?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan followed the mishna that discusses the double payment because there is a verse that supports it: “And when a man shall sanctify his house to be holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:14), from which it is derived: Just as one’s house is in his possession, so too anything that one consecrates must be in his possession, excluding items that have been stolen from him.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § Abaye said: If Rabbi Yoḥanan had not said that the pious ones and Rabbi Dosa said the same thing, i.e., their rulings are identical, I would say that the pious ones accept the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, but Rabbi Dosa does not accept the opinion of the pious ones.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Abaye elaborates: The pious ones accept the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, for the following reason: And if the Sages instituted an ordinance for the sake of a thief, to prevent him from eating unredeemed fourth-year grapes, by allowing the owner to desacralize produce that is no longer in his possession, does it need to be said that they did so for the sake of innocent poor people, as Rabbi Dosa claimed? Conversely, Rabbi Dosa does not accept the opinion of the pious ones, as he says: It is for the sake of poor people that the Sages instituted an ordinance; but the Sages did not institute an ordinance for the sake of a thief, in line with the aforementioned principle: Feed it to the wicked man and let him die.