Traité Bava Kamma

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : but one who denies a claim concerning having taken a deposit is disqualified from bearing witness, because if it is clear that the deposit is in his possession, yet he denies it, he must be lying.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara raises a further difficulty with regard to Rav Sheshet’s opinion: But didn’t Ilfa say that an oath effects acquisition, meaning that once he testified falsely that he did not become a bailee, the item in question becomes his property, rendering him liable as a robber even for damage or loss resulting from accidents? The Gemara infers: It is the taking of an oath that effects acquisition, but mere denial of having become a bailee does not effect acquisition. The Gemara rejects this distinction: Here too, Ilfa must be referring to a case where the deposit stands in a place not in the bailee’s possession, e.g., a swamp, and as long as he does not take an oath, it can be assumed that his intention is simply to be evasive. But if the animal was standing in his house, then he acquires it as soon as he denies the claim.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And if you wish, say instead: What is the meaning of Ilfa’s statement that an oath effects acquisition? It is in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna says that Rav said that if one party says: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other party says: You do not have any money in my possession, and the latter took an oath to that effect, and later, witnesses came and testified that his oath was false, he is exempt, as it is stated: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them both, to see whether he has not put his hand unto his neighbor’s goods; and the owner thereof shall accept it, and he shall not make restitution” (Exodus 22:10); teaching that once the owner received an oath, the one who took the oath no longer pays monetary restitution. Ilfa’s statement that an oath effects acquisition means that the bailee will no longer have to pay monetary restitution, and it does not relate to Rav Sheshet’s statement that the bailee becomes responsible for damage resulting from accidents as soon as he denies the claim.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § Having mentioned Rav’s ruling, the Gemara addresses the matter itself: Rav Huna says that Rav says that if one party says: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other party says: You do not have any money in my possession, and the latter takes an oath to that effect, and later, witnesses came and testified that his oath was false, he is exempt, as it is stated: “And the owner thereof shall accept it, and he shall not make restitution” (Exodus 22:10); teaching that once the owner received an oath, the one who took the oath no longer pays monetary restitution.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rava said: Rav’s statement is reasonable in the case of one who denies having taken a loan, which is intended for expenditure. Since the money is no longer in his possession, the Torah exempts him from monetary restitution once he takes an oath. But in the case of one who denies having accepted a deposit, it remains in the owner’s possession and must be returned intact, and it is not considered to be monetary restitution. Rava continues: But, by God, Rav said his statement even in the case of one who denies having accepted a deposit, as when this verse exempting him from payment is written, it is written in the case of one who denies having accepted a deposit.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § The Gemara relates that Rav Naḥman was sitting and saying this halakha. Rav Aḥa bar Minyumi raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from that which was taught in a mishna (108b): If the owner asked the bailee: Where is my deposit, and the bailee said to him: It is lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen, thereby accepting the oath, and the witnesses testify about the bailee that he consumed the deposit, then he must pay the principal. If he admitted of his own accord that he had taken a false oath, then he must pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering. This indicates that one is required to pay monetary restitution for a deposit even after taking an oath.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Naḥman said to him: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one takes an oath outside of court, which does not exempt him from paying restitution. Rav Aḥa bar Minyumi said to him: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: If the owner asked the bailee: Where is my deposit, and the bailee said to him: It was stolen, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen, thereby accepting the oath; and the witnesses testify about the bailee that he stole it, he must pay the payment of double the principal. If he admitted of his own accord that he had taken a false oath, then he must pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering. And if it enters your mind that this oath was taken outside of court, is there an obligation of double payment in such a circumstance?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Naḥman said to him: I am able to answer you by saying that the first clause of the mishna is referring to one who took an oath outside of court, and the latter clause of the mishna is referring to one who took an oath in court, but we will not answer you with a forced answer. Instead, I will explain it in this manner: Both this clause and that clause are referring to an oath taken in court, and it is not difficult. Here, the ruling of the first clause is with regard to one who leaped to take an oath as soon as the other litigant stated his claim, even though the court had not yet required him to do so, which is not considered a full-fledged oath. There, the ruling of the latter clause is with regard to one who did not leap but took an oath only when required by the court.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rami bar Ḥama said to Rav Naḥman: After all, you do not hold in accordance with the statement of Rav; why are you pledging yourself to explain the statement of Rav so that it not be contradicted by the mishna? Rav Naḥman said to him: I said this not to justify Rav’s ruling but to clarify the statement of Rav, as Rav would explain the mishna in this manner, as I did.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: But Rav quoted a verse, so how could Rav Naḥman not agree with his statement? The Sages said in response: This verse was not written to teach the ruling of Rav; rather, it comes to teach the halakha that all those discussed in the Torah who are required to take oaths, take oaths and do not pay; as the verse should be interpreted as follows: “And the owner thereof shall accept it, and he shall not make restitution” (Exodus 22:10), teaching that one who has the obligation to pay is the one who takes an oath, and not the one demanding payment.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Hamnuna raises an objection to Rav’s statement from a different mishna (Shevuot 36b), which states: If an owner requested the return of his deposit and the purported bailee denied having received it, and the owner administered an oath to the bailee about the deposit five times, whether before the court or not before the court, and the bailee denied the claim each time, he is liable for each and every one of the oaths and must pay the additional one-fifth payment and bring a guilt-offering for each one. And Rabbi Shimon says: What is the reason? Since he is able to retract and admit after each oath, at which point he would be liable to pay, therefore each subsequent false oath is a denial of that liability. It can be seen from this mishna that one who admits liability after having taken a false oath is liable to pay, counter to the statement of Rav.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And here, you cannot say that the mishna in Shevuot is referring to a case where the bailee leaped to volunteer his oath, because it teaches explicitly that the owner administered an oath to the bailee about the deposit. And you cannot say that the mishna in Shevuot is referring to a case where the bailee took his oath outside of court, because it teaches explicitly that the halakha applies whether the oath was taken before the court or not before the court.