Traité Bava Kamma

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : to purchase wheat for him, which he plans to sell at a profit, and instead the agent purchased barley with the money, or if he gave his agent money to purchase barley and instead he purchased wheat with the money, two baraitot issue discordant rulings with regard to the halakha. It is taught in one baraita that if there was a loss, the loss is for the agent, and if there was a profit, the profit is for the agent as well, as he is considered to have abrogated his status as an agent by deviating from the instructions. And it is taught in one baraita (Tosefta, Bava Metzia 4:20) that if there was an agreement that both parties would split the profits from the transaction, if there was a loss, the loss is for the agent, and if there was a profit, the profit goes to the middle, i.e., the agent and the investor split the profit.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : To reconcile the baraitot, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is not difficult. This first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and this second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Yoḥanan explains his rationale: This first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a change by an agent that deviates from the terms of his assignment means that the agent acquires the item in question for himself, as in the case of one who was paid to dye wool red but dyed it black. In this case as well, when the agent purchases wheat instead of barley, or vice versa, he acquires the grain for himself. And this second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a change by an agent which deviates from the terms of his assignment does not mean that the agent acquires the item in question for himself. It is acquired by the one who appointed the agent, and they split the profits as agreed. But the agent is held responsible for any loss incurred, due to his deviation from the instructions.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Elazar objects to this explanation: From where do you say that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda extends to the case of these baraitot? Perhaps Rabbi Meir says that a change by an agent from the terms of his assignment results in the acquisition of the item by the agent only with regard to an item that is fit for use by the one who appointed the agent himself, such as wool dyed the wrong color, which is now not usable for its intended purpose. But Rabbi Meir does not say his ruling with regard to an item purchased for subsequent sale as merchandise, since it is intended to be sold for a profit in any event, and the transaction would take effect as agreed upon initially, with the agent held responsible for any loss incurred.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: Both this baraita and that baraita are written in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it is not difficult. Here, in the first baraita, it is discussing grain purchased for eating, and since the one who appointed the agent desired wheat, he does not acquire the barley. There, in the second baraita, it is discussing grain purchased for subsequent sale as merchandise, and the transaction takes effect as agreed upon initially, with the agent held responsible for any loss incurred.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara notes that they laughed at it in the West, Eretz Yisrael, at the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, a deviation by an agent from the terms of his assignment does not result in the acquisition of the item for the agent himself: And who informed the owner of the wheat, i.e., the seller, that he should transfer the wheat to the owner of the money? If the seller was unaware that the agent was acting on someone else’s behalf, how would the one who appointed the agent acquire the wheat? Rav Shmuel bar Sasrati objects to this rationale: If so, then even in a case where the agent was sent to purchase wheat and he purchased wheat, the one who appointed the agent should not acquire the wheat, since the seller was unaware that the agent was acting on someone else’s behalf.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Abbahu said: The case of an agent who was assigned to purchase wheat and purchased wheat is different, as the agent is performing his assignment and, as such, he is like the customer, i.e., the one who appointed him, and it is as though the latter has purchased the grain himself.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Abbahu further explains: Know that the agent is viewed as an extension of the one who appointed him, as we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 24a): Concerning both one who consecrates his property and one who valuates himself by donating his fixed value to the Temple, the Temple treasury does not have any rights with regard to the donor’s wife’s clothing; and not with regard to his children’s clothing; and not with regard to new clothes colored with dye that the donor dyed for his wife or children; and not with regard to new sandals that the donor purchased for his wife or children. Presumably, the treasurer has no right to these items because they are for the personal use of the donor’s wife and children, and are considered as if owned by them.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Abbahu continues: And why is it so, i.e., why is it that the wife is considered the owner of the dyed clothing for which the husband paid? Here also, let us say: Who informed the dyer that he should transfer his dye to the wife? Rather, is it not because we say that the husband is performing his assignment and, as such, he is like an extension of his wife’s hand? Here also, in the case of one who purchases grain for another, the agent is performing his assignment, and is like an extension of the customer’s hand.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara rejects this explanation. Rabbi Abba said: No, the reason for the ruling of the mishna is that the intention of anyone who consecrates his property is not upon the clothing of his wife and his children, i.e., he does not intend to consecrate those items.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rabbi Zeira objects to Rabbi Abba’s explanation: And is it the intention of a person who consecrates his property to do so upon his phylacteries? Presumably not. And we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 23b) that with regard to one who consecrates all of his property, his phylacteries are evaluated for him and consecrated. Apparently, lack of intent to consecrate a particular item does not prevent its consecration. Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: Yes, the intention of a person who consecrates his property is upon his phylacteries, because one who consecrates his property thinks to himself: I am performing a mitzva, and he therefore intends to include his phylacteries; but the intention of a person is not upon the clothing of his wife and his children, due to the enmity that would be engendered if he consecrated their clothing.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Rav Oshaya also objects to Rabbi Abba’s explanation: But is it not so that the matter of those who are obligated in valuations was taught here in the mishna, and we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 21a): Concerning those who are obligated in valuations, the Temple treasury seizes collateral from them to force them to fulfill their vow.