Traité Avodah Zarah

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : But if they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them, all agree that the offspring are forbidden because the offspring were involved in the act of bestiality, albeit in their fetal state. And here too, the case of the wheat is similar to the case where they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them, because the flour was also worshipped, albeit in the form of a stalk of wheat.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : There are those who say that Mar Zutra himself quoted Rav Naḥman’s statement: The dispute is with regard to a case where it became prohibited to use the animals as offerings because a person engaged in bestiality with them and later they became pregnant. But if they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them, all agree that the offspring are forbidden. And these stalks of wheat, as well, are similar to the case where they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of offspring that it is prohibited to bring as an offering, it was initially an animal, in its fetal state, and now it is still an animal. A fetus is treated as a full-fledged animal, and the opening of the womb is compared to a closed door that holds it in its place. Here, in the case of the flour, it was initially wheat and now it is flour; it is in a totally new form. Therefore, no proof can be derived from the mishna.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : § Reish Lakish raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to a palm tree, what is the halakha with regard to its lulav? Is it permitted to use a lulav cut from it for the mitzva or not?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara narrows down the dilemma: With regard to a tree that one initially planted for such an idolatrous purpose, do not raise the dilemma. In that case the halakha is clear, as it is prohibited to use it even for an ordinary, non-mitzva, purpose. Rather, raise the dilemma with regard to a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And do not raise the dilemma according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, who holds that even for an ordinary purpose it is forbidden (see 45b). Rather, when should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that such a tree does not become forbidden: What is the halakha with regard to using a lulav from such a worshipped tree for a mitzva? Is it nevertheless forbidden because it is considered repulsive to use such a lulav for the Most High, i.e., for a mitzva, or not?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he presented a different understanding of Reish Lakish’s dilemma. He said: Reish Lakish raises the dilemma with regard to an ashera whose status as an object of idol worship was revoked. His dilemma is as follows: Is there disqualification with regard to mitzvot or is there no disqualification with regard to mitzvot? This lulav was once unfit for the mitzva, since it was worshipped while attached to the tree. Is it permanently disqualified, i.e., can it never be rendered fit? Or is the halakha that there is no permanent disqualification with regard to mitzvot, and consequently when the tree’s status as an object of idol worship was revoked, the lulav became fit for the mitzva?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from that which we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 37a): With regard to one who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird and is obligated to cover the blood, if he covered the blood and it was then uncovered he is exempt from the obligation to cover it a second time. But if the wind blew dust and covered the blood and no person was involved, he is obligated to cover it. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna taught that one is obligated to cover the blood after the wind covered it only in a case where the blood was then exposed. But if it was not then exposed, he is exempt from the obligation to cover it.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And we discussed this issue and asked: When the blood was then exposed, what of it? Why is one obligated to cover it a second time? Once it was disqualified, it should remain disqualified. When the wind covered the blood, the person was exempted from covering the blood. If so, even if the blood is subsequently uncovered, he should remain exempt. Why, then, is he obligated to cover the blood in that case?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : And Rav Pappa says: That is to say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot. Once the cause of the exemption from the obligation is removed, one is once again obligated to fulfill the mitzva. If so, Reish Lakish’s dilemma is resolved.

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : The Gemara rejects this suggestion: It is with regard to Rav Pappa’s resolution itself that Reish Lakish raised the dilemma. Is it obvious to Rav Pappa, based on the discussion with regard to the blood, that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot; and there is no difference whether that ruling leads to leniency, as in the case of the worshipped tree whose status as an object of idol worship was revoked, thereby permitting its lulav branch to be used for a mitzva, and there is no difference whether that ruling leads to stringency, as in the case of the blood, where one is obligated to cover it anew?

Traduction française en préparation — version anglaise (Steinsaltz) : Or perhaps is he uncertain, and therefore, when that ruling leads to stringency, we say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot, and one must perform the mitzva. But when that ruling leads to leniency, we do not say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot. The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.